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INTRODUCTION

Foreign-born workers in the United States, particularly those of
Latino origin, experience

a disproportionate

number of workplace

fatalities.' This article is the first in a series of three articles that together
form a scholarly project that unearths the causes of the recent trend in
immigrant worker fatalities and injuries, and presents recommendations
for reversing it.2 This first contribution, A New Vision for Workplace
1. See infra Section I for a detailed discussion of this trend. In this article, I use the
term "Latino" to describe persons of Latin American ancestry. The federal government
data relating to occupational safety and health uses both "Hispanic" and "Hispanic or
Latino" as descriptors for the same population. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2007, at 1,
5, 10 (Aug. 20, 2008) [hereinafter BLS Press Release, 2007 Fatalities] (using both
"Hispanic" and "Hispanic or Latino" without distinguishing between the two), availableat
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cfoi-08202008.pdf.
The seeming interchangeability of the terms reflects an ongoing public debate as to whether "Hispanic" or "Latino"

is more suitable. See Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin
Subclassifications: The Context That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 920-23 (2007)
(situating the public debate within the context of the United States' struggle "with its own
history of racial and national origin-based oppression").
2. This scholarly project is motivated, in part, by the relatively limited attention that
legal scholars have given to occupational safety and health issues over the past decade. To
be sure, considerable attention has been directed to the plight of immigrant workers in
general and to the gradual erosion of labor and employment protections for undocumented
workers in particular. The result of this focus has been a wealth of important and insightful
scholarship. See, e.g., Anne Marie O'Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers'
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Regulation, examines how the history, structure, and operations of the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have, at
times, obscured the workplace safety concerns of immigrant workers and
have left these workers with no meaningful voice in the regulatory process.
The second article in the series will explore how labor and immigration
laws, operating in the context of shifting economic, social, and political
currents, affect the behavior of immigrant workers with respect to
occupational safety and health. The final article will analyze this
phenomenon from the perspective of employers who hire immigrant
workers and consider the multiple forces that influence their perceptions
of immigrant labor and, correspondingly, their decisions vis-A-vis
workplace safety and health.
In this first article, I offer a close examination and critique of OSHA.'
Specifically, I argue that structural features of the workplace safety and
health regime-including the rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement
processes-have historically disadvantaged foreign-born workers and
prevented OSHA from fulfilling its statutory mandate "to assure so far as
possible [for] every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions."4 These structural limitations, when coupled
with the multiple ways in which law and society have subordinated foreignborn workers, have rendered these workers particularly susceptible to
workplace injuries and deaths..
In Section I of this Article, I detail recent trends in occupational
fatalities and injuries among foreign-born workers in the United States,
Compensation After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U.

REV.

L. &

SOC. CHANGE 299 (2006); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented

Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004). The regulation of occupational safety and
health, however, has failed to hold the public's attention, despite its critical importance to
the immigrant workforce.
3. Although relatively few authors have examined the failings of OSHA vis-A-vis the
immigrant workforce, this matter has nonetheless garnered the attention of the federal
government. In September 2003, following a request by Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY),
the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Labor performed an evaluation
of OSHA's handling of immigrant workers' fatalities. OFFICE

OF INSPECTOR

GEN., U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, EVALUATION OF OSHA's HANDLING OF IMMIGRANT FATALITIES IN THE
WORKPLACE, REPORT No. 21-03-023-10-001 (2003) [hereinafter OIG IMMIGRANT
FATALITIES REPORT]. Although the report was issued nearly six years ago, workplace

fatalities among immigrant workers continued to rise through 2006. See infra Section I.
Additionally, some of the recommendations made in the report have not been
implemented. See infra Section IV. That said, it is apparent that OSHA acknowledges the
importance of reducing injuries and fatalities among Latino workers. Indeed, perusal of the
OSHA website reveals the agency's demonstrated effort to reach out to Spanish-speaking
employers and workers. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, OSHA Compliance Assistance: Hispanic Employers and Workers, http://
www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance-assistance/index hispanic.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
This article argues that a deeper critique of OSHA, and a more transformative regulatory
approach, is needed.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
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drawing particular attention to the most dangerous industries and to the
plight of Latino immigrant workers, who are at greatest risk for workplace
fatalities. In Section II, I explore the origins of the federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act (the OSH Act), the broad mandate of OSHA, and
its oversight and enforcement functions. Following this discussion, in
Section III of this article, I describe how the history, structure, and
operations of OSHA present inherent limitations, which impede OSHA's
ability to execute its mandate vis-A-vis immigrant workers.
In view of the deficiencies in the existing regulatory regime, I close this
article with a set of regulatory imperatives to guide OSHA's future work
with respect to immigrant workers.
By embracing principles of
transparency, cooperative regulation, and antisubordination,5 OSHA can
more effectively address the needs of immigrant workers and still remain
true to the agency's raison d'6tre. These regulatory imperatives, which
translate into specific policy recommendations, serve a broader set of
purposes: shedding light upon the plight of immigrant workers, reclaiming
the agency of workers and their advocates, and bringing an end to the
legacy of invisibility and marginalization of immigrant workers in the
occupational safety and health regime. These imperatives provide a
framework for other agencies that have failed to adequately protect or
otherwise address the concerns of a historically disadvantaged
constituency.

5. See infra Section IV for a fuller description of these regulatory imperatives.
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I.
WORKPLACE FATALITIES AND INJURIES AMONG FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS
IN THE UNITED STATES6

Francisco Alejandro Garcia left his home in the state of
Tabasco, Mexico, insearch of better economic opportunitiesin
the United States. He made his way to Martinsville, Virginia,
where he obtained employment with the National Service
Company, a company that had contracted to perform cleaning
services for the Knauss Snack Food Company. Francisco was
paid nine dollars per hour to perform the difficult work of
washing large industrial machines at the Knauss factory. On
Friday,March 17, 2006,Francisco,at the age of nineteen, died
after falling into a processing machine. At the time, he was
spraying the blades of the machine as they rotated; either
Francisco slipped, or the hose got caught in the blades and
pulled him in. National Service Company was charged with a
"serious" violation and fined $7,000 for the conditions that led
to Francisco'sdeath. Francisco'sremains were shipped back to
Mexico at an estimatedcost of $6,800.'
6. Note that the data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), a subdivision
of the Department of Labor, does not distinguish between foreign-born workers who are
lawfully present in the United States and those who are not. As discussed more fully infra,
immigration status can have a significant impact on a given worker's experience vis-A-vis
the occupational safety and health regime. Indeed, many of the structural limitations
described in Section III, infra, are heightened with respect to undocumented workers.
Also, although the terms "immigrant worker" and "foreign-born worker" are used
somewhat interchangeably throughout this article, a connotative distinction does exist.
"Immigrant worker" connotes a recent arrival to the United States, often with a limited
immigration status or no immigration status at all. "Foreign-born worker," however,
suggests a wide range of individuals across different professions and necessarily includes
naturalized U.S. citizens. Again, the BLS's data does not differentiate between these
subgroups in the foreign-born workforce.
Finally, the data presented herein, in both aggregate and industry-specific forms, must
be viewed in the context of economic trends in particular industries and in the nation at
large. Preliminary BLS data for 2008, just released as this article was going to press, reflect
a decline in workplace fatalities across all demographic groups. See Press Release, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries in 2008, at 5 (Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter BLS Press Release, 2008 Fatalities],
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.
It appears that the drop in
fatalities is related to the general decrease in economic activity nationwide. Not
surprisingly, construction-related fatalities have declined significantly, given that industry's
difficulties in the current economic downturn; other industries, such as farming, have
continued to experience increased fatalities. Id.at 1. Increases in fatalities for certain
occupations could also be attributable, in part, to a short-term jump in demand for a
particular product or type of labor. As explored further in this article, aspects of OSHA's
structure and operations must also be considered when assessing injury and fatality trends
among immigrant workers.
7. Body Will Be Shipped to Mexico: Garcia'sEmployer to Pay Costs, MARTINSVILLE
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The story of Francisco Alejandro Garcia is one of thousands of similar
stories that have emerged in recent years detailing workplace injuries and
fatalities among immigrants in the United States. These stories, which
originate in various states and implicate different industries, together
display a disturbing pattern. In the agricultural fields of central California,
immigrant farm workers with limited access to water have succumbed to
heatstroke and dehydration; during the summer of 2008, at least six farm
worker fatalities in California were linked to heat-related causes.' In New
York City and other metropolitan centers, particularly those with strong
housing markets, spikes in construction work have come at a significant
cost to immigrant laborers in the form of debilitating injuries, many of
which go unreported. 9
These news reports regarding workplace fatalities and injuries among
immigrants are supported by the data collected by the U.S. government
and other sources.'" These data suggest that workplace injuries and deaths
among foreign-born workers in the United States have reached new
heights. Over the last several years, data from the federal Bureau of Labor
BULL., Mar. 24, 2006, available athttp://www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID=519&
back=archives; Fine Set in Fatality at Knauss Plant, MARTINSVILLE BULL., Oct. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID=4710&back=archives;
Shawn Hopkins, Worker Killed at Knauss, MARTINSVILLE BULL., Mar. 19, 2006, available
Holly
at
http://www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID=541&back=archives;
Kozelsky, Death of Francisco Alejandro Garcia: Husband Dies as Wife, 2-Year-Old
DaughterMake 3,000-Mile Trip, MARTINSVILLE BULL., Mar. 23, 2006, available at http://
Plant Death Probe
www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID=523&back=archives;
http://
Ongoing,
MARTINSVILLE
BULL.,
Mar.
20,
2006,
available at
www.martinsvillebulletin.com/article.cfm?ID=537&back=archives.
8. Press Release, United Farm Workers, Coachella Valley Farm Worker Latest Victim
to Succumb to Probable Heat-Related Causes (Aug. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.ufw.org/_board.php?mode=view&b-code=news-press&b-no=4577&page=2&fi
eld=&key=&n=538.
9. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 110TH CONG., HIDDEN TRAGEDY:
UNDERREPORTING OF WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES 12 (2008) [hereinafter HIDDEN

(citing various studies to show that immigrants are likely to underreport
workplace injuries and illnesses), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/publications/
20080619WorkplacelnjuriesReport.pdf; Susan Donaldson James, Construction Worker
Deaths Spike: Building Boom, Cheap Labor Leads to Surge in Laborer Deaths,
ABCNEwS.COM, Jan. 16, 2008, http://a.abcnews.comUS/ Story?id=4139502&page=l.
10. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is the most comprehensive source of
statistics about workplace injuries and fatalities. The functions of the BLS related to
fatality, injury, and illness data stem from the OSH Act, which calls for the Secretary of
Labor to "develop and maintain an effective program of collection, compilation, and
analysis of occupational safety and health statistics." 29 U.S.C. § 673 (2006).
The BLS obtains its data regarding nonfatal injuries and illnesses by surveying nearly
300,000 representative workplaces. The BLS's data is necessarily incomplete because many
employers simply are not surveyed and the agency relies upon voluntary reporting for those
it does survey. Many immigrant workers are employed in relatively unregulated industries
and by smaller employers, making the reporting of workplace injuries and deaths even
more unlikely. See HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 9, at 6 (describing fundamental
limitations in the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses).

TRAGEDY]
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Statistics (BLS) have shown a gradual increase in the percentage of
immigrant worker fatalities among overall workplace fatalities. 1 In 1992,
foreign-born workers accounted for 10.2% of all workplace fatalities; by
2006, this proportion had increased to 17.9%.2 While percentage of
foreign-born worker fatalities dropped slightly to 17.8% in 2007, the data
still reflect an overall trend of increased fatalities among foreign-born
workers from 1992 to 2007.13
Mirroring a general trend in foreign-born worker fatalities, workrelated fatalities involving Latinos in the United States have steadily
increased in recent years. According to the BLS, in 2005, fatal work
injuries among foreign-born Latino workers increased by nearly 5% over
the previous year, reaching 625 fatalities.14 Among the 1046 foreign-born
worker fatalities in 2006,"5 667 (or 11% of the total fatalities) involved
foreign-born Latino workers. 16 In absolute numbers, both of these figures
were the highest ever recorded by the BLS for the time that these data
have been kept. 7 While initial data suggest the numbers dropped slightly
in 2007 to 607 fatalities among foreign-born Latino workers out of 959
total deaths for foreign-born workers, the data still reflect an overall
upward trend.18 Indeed, Latino immigrants have comprised the majority of
workplace fatalities among foreign-born workers in recent years.

11. Compare U.S.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF

FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, 1992-2007, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter CENSUS OF
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS] (providing the BLS's data regarding overall

workplace fatalities), availableathttp:// www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfchOO06.pdf, with AFLCIO, FOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES, 1992-2007, at 3 (2008) [hereinafter FOREIGNBORN WORKER FATALITIES] (providing the BLS's data regarding fatalities among foreignborn workers from 1992 to 2007), available athttp://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/
upload/_46.pdf.
12. FOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES, supranote 11, at 3 (a comparison of the data
shows that, in 1992, 635 of the 6217 total fatalities involved foreign-born workers, whereas
in 2006, 1046 of the 5840 total workplace fatalities involved foreign-born workers).
13. Compare CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 1,
11, with FOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES, supra note 11, at 3. The total number and
proportion of foreign-born worker fatalities decreased slightly from 1046 and 17.9% in 2006
to 1009 and 17.8% in 2007. Id. Nevertheless, the data from 1992 to 2007 reflect an overall
upward trend of fatalities among foreign-born workers.
FOREIGN-BORN WORKER
FATALITIES, supra note 11, at 3.
14. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2005, at 5 (Aug. 10, 2006) (hereinafter BLS Press
Release, 2005 Fatalities], available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cfoi08102006.pdf.
15. FOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES, supra note 11, at 3.
16. CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 10.
17. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REVISIONS TO THE 2006
CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES FILE 1 (2006) [hereinafter REVISIONS TO THE
2006 CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES] (describing these figures as "new highs
for the series"), availableat http://www.bls.gov/iif/ oshwc/cfoi/cfoi-revised06.pdf.
18. CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 10.
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According to recent studies, Latino men "have the greatest overall
relative risk of fatal occupational injury of any gender, race or ethnic
group." The risk of dying on the job is "22 percent higher for Latino men
than the relative risk for all men."19 When data regarding occupational
fatalities for foreign-born workers are disaggregated, "the most significant
factor for these workers' relative fatality risk appears to be their region of
origin. ,21
The data reported in the last few years are only one component of a
much longer trend. Between 1992 and 2002, for example, workplace
fatalities among foreign-born workers increased by 46.3%.21
While
troubling, that statistic obscures the even greater increase among Latino
immigrant workers, who comprise approximately half of the foreign-born
workforce; 22 fatalities among foreign-born Latino workers more than
doubled during that same period, increasing by approximately 110%.23
Yet during the same period, the overall number of workplace fatalities
decreased from 6217 in 1992 to 5534 in 2002.24 The broad narrative
propagated by OSHA is that fatalities are declining overall and the
workplace is getting safer. 25 This narrative ignores the fact that fatalities
among foreign-born workers have generally been on the rise in recent
years.
With respect to nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses, the data
suggest a similar increase in injuries among foreign-born workers.
Regrettably, the BLS does not report data that reveal the exact numbers of
injuries and illnesses suffered by foreign-born workers. The data regarding
injuries among "Hispanic or Latino" workers, while certainly not a perfect
substitute, reflect a marked increase in certain industries. For example, in
2003, in construction and extractive occupations, OSHA recorded 26,910
nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses among Hispanic or Latino
workers.26 By 2006, this number had increased to 34,170 incidents, or an
19. AFL-CIO, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK: THE URGENT NEED FOR IMPROVED
WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAMS 3 (2005) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT
RISK], availableat http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/upload/immigrant-risk.pdf.
20. Id.at 4.
21. SeeFOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES, supra note 11, at 3.
22. IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 1. Approximately 22% of
foreign-born workers in the United States are of Asian ancestry. Id.
23. CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 10. In
absolute numbers, the fatalities increased from 275 in 1992 to 578 in 2002. Id
24. Id.at 1.
25. See, e.g., BLS Press Release, 2007 Fatalities, supra note 1, at 1, 5, 10 ("[T]he rate of
fatal injury for U.S. workers in 2007 was.., the lowest annual fatality rate ever reported by
the fatality census").
26. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE: NUMBER OF
NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES INVOLVING DAYS AWAY FROM WORK,

2003-2006 [hereinafter NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES 2003-2006] (on file with
author). As the title of the table suggests, this figure captures only those incidents that led
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27%.27

Although similar trends are not immediately apparent for all
immigrant-heavy industries, data classified by the "nature of the injury [or]
illness" reflect significant increases for Hispanic or Latino workers for
certain categories.
For example, between 2003 and 2006, "cuts,
lacerations, and punctures" among Hispanic or Latino workers increased
by 16%.28 The number of "heat burns" has increased slightly, as have
"[a]mputations," "[m]ultiple injuries," and "[s]oreness and pain." 9
Two other perspectives on the data provide insight into the nature of
the injuries and illnesses experienced by foreign-born workers: the part of
the body affected and the nature of the exposure. Between 2003 and 2006,
Latino workers experienced a 22% rise in nonfatal injuries to the head and
37% rise in nonfatal injuries to the neck. Regarding the nature of the
event or exposure, contact with objects or equipment increased by 12%
between 2003 and 2006; injuries related to being struck by an object
increased by 7%.3o The most noticeable increase in nonfatal workplace
injuries derived from assaults and violent acts. In 2003, OSHA reported
1810 assaults or violent acts against Latino or Hispanic workers. This
number jumped to 2750 in 2006, an increase of 52% over a three-year
period.3 1
The rise in fatalities and injuries among foreign-born workers is not
attributable solely to an increased proportion of foreign-born employees in
the workforce. Although the proportion of foreign-born workers in the
overall workforce has gradually increased in recent years, the percentage
of fatalities suffered by that population has grown at a higher rate.32 For
to a one-day absence (or longer) from work.
27. Id. But see Xiaofei Zhang, Songlin Yu, Krista Wheeler, Kelly Kelleher, Lorann
Stallones & Huiyun Xiang, Work-Related Non-Fatal Injuries Among Foreign-Born and
U.S.-Born Workers.-Findingsfrom the U.S.NationalHealth Interview Survey, 1997-2005,
52 AM. J. IND. MED. 25, 30 (2009) (concluding that while foreign-born workers had lower
reported overall injury rates than their native-born counterparts, the reported severity of
the injuries they sustained may have been greater).
28. NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES 2003-2006, supra note 26. In absolute
numbers, this represented an increase from 19,300 incidents in 2003 to 22,410 incidents in
2006.
29. Id. Based on the existing data, these four categories of injuries have registered a
slight increase. A longer-term perspective will help to gauge the statistical significance of
this three-year trend.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. In 2006, foreign-born workers comprised 15.3% of the U.S. labor force, yet they
experienced 17.9% of workplace fatalities. Compare Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 2006,
at 1 (Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Labor Force Characteristics in 2006], available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/forbrn 04252007.pdf,
with
FOREIGN-BORN
WORKER FATALITIES, supra note 11, at 3, and CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES
CHARTS, supra note 11, at 1. Fatalities were similarly disproportionate in 2007 (15.7% of
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example, although the share of foreign-born employment increased by
22% between 1996 and 2000, the share of fatal occupational injuries for
this same population increased by 43 %.33
The Department of Labor and OSHA have not been blind to these
trends in work-related fatalities and injuries among immigrants. In August
2001, Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao called for the establishment of a
Hispanic Task Force, which was charged with examining how effectively
OSHA interfaced with Latino workers in all aspects of the agency's
operations. 4
Similarly, in its most recent strategic plan, OSHA
acknowledged diversification of the overall workforce and the unique
safety and health challenges faced by immigrant workers.3 ' The plan calls
for innovations in enforcement, training, and education in response to the
changing workforce.3 6 Although these efforts are laudable, the trends
evidenced by the data call for much more fundamental reforms.3 7
A. The Most DangerousIndustries and Occupationsfor Immigrants
Apart from region of origin, other important determinants of risk for
the workforce versus 17.8% of fatalities) and 2008 (15.6% of the workforce versus 16% of
fatalities). Compare Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 2008, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter Labor Force Characteristics in 2008], available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf, andPressRelease, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 2007, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2008)
[hereinafter Labor Force Characteristics in 2007], available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/forbrn_03262008.pdf, with FOREIGN-BORN WORKER FATALITIES,
supra note 11, at 3, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at
1, andBLS Press Release, 2008 Fatalities, supranote 6, at 5.
33. Katherine Loh & Scott Richardson, Foreign-Born Workers.- Trends in Fatal
OccupationalInjuries,1996-2001, 127 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 42, 42 (2004). A separate study
found that Latino immigrants comprised 11% of the U.S. labor force, yet experienced 14%
of the fatal occupational injuries in 2000. Workplace Safety and HealthIssues Confronting
Immigrant Workers.-HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Employment., Safety, and Training
of the H Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health), available at
http://www.nycosh.org/immigrant and-other/senateFeb27_hearing.html.
34. Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact
Sheet: OSHA Programs to Help Hispanic Workers (2001) [hereinafter OSHA Programs to
Help Hispanic Workers] (on file with author).
35. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA
2003-2008 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN (2002), available at http://www.osha.gov/
StratPlanPublic/strategicmanagementplan-final.html.
36. See id. at § 3. While OSHA's comprehensive list of strategic challenges
acknowledges the need to focus on immigrant workers, none of the overarching
performance goals or areas of emphasis in the plan focus on immigrants. In fact, the
descriptions of the strategic goals reference immigrants only once, when the agency calls, in
the most general terms, for the identification of "new opportunities ... to significantly
improve workplace safety and health" for immigrant workers. Id.
37. See infra Section IV.
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occupational fatalities and injuries are occupation and, relatedly, the
industry in which the worker is employed. In 2007, workplace fatalities
were among the highest in the construction industry (1204 fatalities);
transportation and warehousing (890); agriculture, forestry, fishing and
hunting (585); manufacturing (400); and retail trade (348).38 In 2007, the
fatality rate was greatest in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (27.9
per 100,000 workers); followed by mining (25.1 per 100,000 workers);
transportation and warehousing (16.9 per 100,000 workers); and
construction (10.5 per 100,000 workers).39 Similar breakdowns in the
Unsurprisingly,
fatality data were observed in 200640 and 2005. "l
immigrant workers are concentrated in those industries where workplace
fatalities and injuries are most prevalent.42 Indeed, immigrant workers are
more likely to be employed in construction, manufacturing, transportation,
38. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE Al: FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY INDUSTRY AND EVENT OR EXPOSURE, ALL UNITED STATES
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 FATALITIES BY INDUSTRY AND EVENT, TABLE Al], available at

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftbO223.pdf.
CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 13.
40. In 2006, fatalities were among the highest in the construction industry (1239
fatalities); transportation and warehousing (860); agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
(655); manufacturing (456); and retail trade (359). 2007 FATALITIES BY INDUSTRY AND
EVENT, TABLE Al, supra note 38. Although broken down by slightly different categories
than those in the 2007 chart, the BLS reports that, in 2006, the highest fatality rate
(calculated as the number of fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 employed workers) was
in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (30.0), followed by mining/natural resources
and mining (28.1/29.5); transportation and warehousing (16.8); and construction/natural
resources, construction, and maintenance occupations (10.9/12.5). U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR

39.

STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATALITY RATES BY INDUSTRY, OCCUPATION, AND

(2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/iifl
oshwc/cfoi/CFOIRates_2006.pdf.
41. In 2005, fatalities were among the highest, once again, in the construction industry
(1192), transportation and warehousing (885), agriculture (715), retail trade (400), and
manufacturing (393). 2007 FATALITIES BY INDUSTRY AND EVENT, TABLE Al, supra note 38.
Although broken down by slightly different categories than those in the 2007 chart, the
BLS reported that, in 2005, the highest fatality rate (calculated as the number of fatal
occupational injuries per 100,000 employed workers) was in agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and hunting (32.5), followed by mining (25.6); transportation and warehousing (17.7); and
natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations/construction (12.3/11.1).
SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATALITY RATES BY INDUSTRY,
OCCUPATION, AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS (2006), availableat http://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/CFOIRates_2006.pdf.
42. Labor Force Characteristics in 2008, supra note 32, at 2. In the most recent BLS
survey of the foreign-born workforce, the Department of Labor estimated that 10.4% of
foreign-born workers are engaged in construction and extraction occupations; 9.3% are
engaged in production occupations; 8.9% are engaged in sales and related occupations;
8.2% are engaged in building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance occupations; and 7.5%
are engaged in food preparation and serving-related occupations. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE 4: EMPLOYED FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVEBORN PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER BY OCCUPATION AND SEX, 2008 ANNUAL AVERAGES

(2009) [hereinafter 2009 EMPLOYEES BY OCCUPATION AND SEX], available at http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t04.htm.
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and the service industries (e.g., leisure and hospitality), as compared with
the native-born population.4 3 In the agricultural sector, approximately
78% of all migrant and seasonal farm workers in the United States are
foreign-born."
The subsections that follow provide additional information about
some of the most dangerous industries and immigrant representation in
those industries. By way of an overview, three broad categories of
incidents-transportation accidents, falls, or contacts-account for more
than half of the workplace fatalities among foreign-born workers.45
1. Construction
In January 2008, "Jigh-rise scaffolding covered in heavy
concrete collapsed at the site of Donald Trump's hotel and
One Ukrainian
condo complex in Lower Manhattan.
immigrant worker-the father of several children-was
decapitatedas he plunged 42 stories to his death. Three others
were injured.... Two months [earlier], another immigrant
worker was killed when he fell 15 stories.,"6
Fatal accidents in the construction industry range in nature from falls,
such as the one at the Trump complex, to contacts with objects and
equipment. Among occupational fatalities in the construction sector, the
vast majority are suffered by construction trade workers, especially
construction laborers, carpenters, and roofers.4 7 Foreign-born workers,

43. See 2009 EMPLOYEES BY OCCUPATION AND SEX, supra note 42. The percent
distribution of foreign-born workers compared to native-born workers in the more
dangerous industries is greater in general categories such as building and grounds, cleaning,
and maintenance occupations (8.2% to 2.9%); natural resources, construction, and
maintenance occupations (15.1% to 9.3%), which includes farming, fishing, and forestry
(1.7% to .5%) and construction and extraction (10.4% to 5.1%); and production,
transportation, and moving material occupations (16.4% to 11.5%). Id. See also Pia
Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in RiskierJobs?19 (Reserve Bank of
Dallas, Working Paper No. 0901, 2009) (utilizing BLS and American Community Survey
data to conclude that "immigrants work in riskier jobs, as measured by injury and fatality
rates, than natives").
44. NAT'L

CENTER

FOR

FARMWORKER

HEALTH,

MIGRANT

AND

SEASONAL

FARMWORKER DEMOGRAPHICS 1 (2009), available at http://www.ncfh.org/docs/fs-Migrant
%20Demographics.pdf.
45. IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 3. Nearly one-quarter of the
fatalities among foreign-born workers were attributed to assaults and violent acts.
Fatalities due to workplace violence are rarely investigated by OSHA, but rather are left to
local law enforcement authorities. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at
iv.
46. James, supra note 9.
47. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL
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especially Latino immigrant workers, are heavily represented in these
occupations."
Among all workers, the construction industry has unquestionably
registered the greatest number of workplace fatalities in recent years.
According to the National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries,
conducted by the BLS, fatal work injuries were highest in the private
construction sector in 2005, 2006, and 2007, as compared with any other
industry.49 Among foreign-born workers, the statistics are equally striking:
the AFL-CIO has reported that between 1996 and 2001 nearly one in four
fatally injured, foreign-born workers was employed in the construction
industry. ° Data from recent years suggest that approximately 30% of
workplace fatalities among Latino immigrants have occurred in
construction.5 1
The risk borne by Latino immigrant construction workers is
disproportionate to their representation in the industry. In 2000, Latino
construction workers made up less than 16% of the construction
workforce, but suffered 23.5% of the fatalities. In that same year, Latino
construction workers were nearly two times more likely to be killed by
occupational injuries than their non-Latino counterparts. 2 Recent reports
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES 2003-2006, at 14 [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL FATALITIES 20032006] (on file with author). Among all construction and extraction occupations, fatalities
among foreign-born workers increased by 40% between 2003 and 2006, rising from 228 to
320 fatalities. ld See also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
TABLE A-5: FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY OCCUPATION AND EVENT OR EXPOSURE,
ALL UNITED STATES (2007) [hereinafter 2007 FATALITIES BY INDUSTRY AND EVENT, TABLE
A-5] (displaying a high number of fatalities among construction and extraction
occupations), availableat http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftbO227.pdf.

48. See generally NATALIA SINIAVSKAIA, NAT'L ASS'N HOME BUILDERS, IMMIGRANT
(2005) (presenting data on immigrant representation in the

WORKERS IN CONSTRUCTION

construction industry drawn from the 2004 American Community Survey conducted by the
Census Bureau), available athttp://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentlD=49216.
49. BLS Press Release, 2007 Fatalities, supra note 1, at 2 ("[C]onstruction continued to
incur the most fatalities of any industry in the private sector, as it has for the five years since
the [Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries] program began using the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) to categorize industry."). In 2007, there were 1178
fatalities in the private construction sector, out of a total of 5488 fatalities. Id. at 3. In 2006,
there were 1239 fatalities in the private construction sector, out of a total of 5703 fatalities.
REVISIONS TO THE 2006 CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, supra note 17, at 2
tbl.1. In 2005, there were 1186 fatal work injuries in the private construction sector, out of a
total of 5702 fatalities. BLS Press Release, 2005 Fatalities, supra note 14, at 3 (Aug. 10,
2006), availableat http://www.bls.gov/ news.release/archives/cfoi_08102006.pdf.
50. IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 4.
51. The data for all Hispanic workers, while not an exact substitute, reveal that 34% of
Latino worker fatalities between 2003 and 2006 occurred in the construction industry. H.
Cierpich, L. Styles, R. Harrison, L. Davis, D. Chester, D. Lefkowitz, D. Valiante, S.
Richardson, D. Castillo, N. Romano & S. Baron, Work-Related Injury Deaths Among
Hispanics- UnitedStates, 1992-2006,57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 597 (2008),
availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5722al.htm.
52. Xuwen Dong & James W. Platner, Occupational Fatalities of Hispanic
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confirm that this trend continues.53
2. Agriculture,Forestry,Fishing, andHunting
"It was a steamy 95 degrees inside the vineyard.., where Maria
Isabel Vasquez Jimenez was pruning a shadeless stretch of
young vines. It was May 14, [2008,] the third day of work for
the 17-year-old immigrant from Oaxaca, Mexico. She'd been
working more than nine hours, with just one water break, when
she collapsed from heat exhaustion at 3:40 p.m.... An hour
and a halflater, when she finally arrivedat an emergency room,
her body temperature was 108.4 degrees. For two days her
heart stopped andstarted,then ceased beatingcompletely. "'4
The death of Maria Isabel Vasquez Jimenez evokes a familiar
narrative of immigrant agricultural workers who toil under dangerous,
sometimes deadly conditions.55 Although the everyday experiences of
these workers are invisible to most, the risks and challenges they face have
seeped into the public consciousness as a result of high-profile organizing
and advocacy efforts, as well as attention in the media. 6
Construction Workers from 1992 to 2000,45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 45, 49 (2004).
53. Stephen Franklin, Uncertain Safety for Latino Workers, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2008,
at C1 ("[F]atality rates in construction [among Latino immigrant workers] have steadily
exceeded those of non-Hispanic workers. .... ").
54. Amanda Witherell, Bucking Off Chuck.- Death of 17-Year-Old PregnantFarm
Worker Incites Campaign Against Trader Joe's, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, July 9, 2008,
availableat http://www.sfbg.comlentry.php?entry-id=6685&catid=&volumeid=317&issue_
id=386&volumenum=42&issuenum-41.
55. See Heat-RelatedDeaths Among Crop Workers.- United States, 1992-2006,300 J.
AM. MED. Assoc. 1017, 1018 (2008) (noting that between 1992 and 2006, 423 worker deaths
from exposure to environmental heat were reported in the United States, with the death
rate for crop workers (.39 heat deaths per 100,000 workers) far exceeding the death rate for
civilian workers (.02 heat deaths per 100,000 workers)). Id at 1017. The report also notes:
[T]he majority of [crop workers dying from heat stroke] were adults aged 20-54
years old, a population not typically considered to be at high risk for heat
illnesses. In addition, the majority of these deaths were among foreign-born
workers ....
Crop workers might be at increased risk for heat stroke because
they often wear extra clothing and personal protective equipment to protect
against pesticide poisoning or green tobacco illness (transdermal nicotine
poisoning).
Id. at 1018. See also Geoffrey M. Calvert, Jennifer Karnik, Louise Mehler, John Beckman,
Barbara Morrissey, Jennifer Sievert, Rosanna Barrett, Michelle Lackovic, Laura Mabee,
Abby Schwartz, Yvette Mitchell & Stephanie Moraga-McHaley, Acute PesticidePoisoning
Among Agricultural Workers in the United States, 1998-2005, 51 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 883
(2008) ("[A]cute pesticide poisoning in the agricultural industry continues to be an
important problem.").
56. See, e.g., Steven Reinberg, Crop Workers Have Highest Heat-RelatedDeathRate,
USNEWS.COM, June 19, 2008, http://health.usnews.comlarticles/health/healthday/2008/06/19/
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The agricultural sector (including forestry, fishing, and hunting) has
registered the highest fatality rate of any industry grouping5 7 -44.8% of all
fatalities among agricultural workers occur in crop, nursery, and
greenhouse production, while 40% of the fatalities occur in ranching and
farming.58 These statistics are troubling for the foreign-born workforce,
given that immigrant workers from Latin America predominate in
agricultural work.5 9
3. Manufacturing
Leonardo Cos Elias, a native of Guatemala, "began working...
at Packaging Concepts Ltd. in Lincoln, [Rhode Island,] a
manufacturerof display cases and furniture.... [H]e worked at
a computer-numericallycontrolled (CNC) router,a high-speed
machine that can cut metals, acrylic and wood while
simultaneously engraving-or carving-intricatedesigns. On
December 14, [2007,] Cos became trappedin the machine and
laypinned to a table while overhead routingdrills bore down on
him. The machine tore into his left leg and buttock. His leg,
halfhispelvis andhis buttock were amputated.6
The gruesome injury suffered by Leonardo Cos Elias reflects the
unique yet formidable risks faced by foreign-born workers in the
manufacturing sector. Fatalities and injuries in the manufacturing sector
are attributable to a range of causes and are scattered across many
61
industries, and specific occupations yield particularly high fatality rates
and fatality numbers. 62 Although data regarding immigrant representation
crop-workers-have-highest-heat-related-death-rate.html.
57. CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES CHARTS, supra note 11, at 13.
58. 2007 FATALITIES BY INDUSTRY AND EVENT, TABLE A-5, supra note 47, at 8 (2007).
59. See NAT'L CENTER FOR FARMWORKER HEALTH, supra note 44 (noting that 78% of
migrant and seasonal farmworkers are foreign-born).
60. Karen Lee Ziner, Over the Border, into the Maw of a Machine, PROVIDENCE J.,
Feb. 17, 2008, at Al available at http://www.projo.com/news/content/LEONARDOMAIN_02-17-08_CE90UTGv51.32c7b56.html.
61. The highest fatality rates within manufacturing in 2006 were in cement, concrete,
lime, and gypsum product manufacturing (with a fatality rate of 19.3 per 100,000 workers);
mineral product manufacturing (with a fatality rate of 11.5 per 100,000 workers); and
animal-food, grain, and oilseed milling (with a fatality rate of 11.3 per 100,000 workers).
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND RATES OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY SELECTED
WORKER CHARACTERISTICS, OCCUPATIONS, AND INDUSTRIES (2006), available at http://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/CFOI Rates_2006.pdf.
62. In 2006, there were eighty-three recorded fatalities in metal manufacturing, sixtyone in food manufacturing, fifty-nine in mineral product manufacturing, fifty in
transportation equipment manufacturing, and thirty-six in wood product manufacturing.
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in specific manufacturing occupations are not available, the BLS reported
a dramatic increase in foreign-born workers across the industry as a whole
from 1996 to 2001.63 In recent years, a greater proportion of the foreignborn workforce has been employed in the manufacturing industry, as
compared with the native-born workforce.' 4 Data at the state level reveal
65
a similarly high concentration of foreign-born workers in manufacturing.
4. Retail Trade
"MohammedAbdul Khaled... was working alone at an Arco
AM-PM mini-mart.., when someone entered the store at
about 1:20 a.m. and shot him once in the torso... Khaled [a
Bangladeshiimmigrant]died at the scene.... The cash register
was empty when police arrived 66
Assaults against convenience store clerks such as Mohammed Abdul
Khaled are commonly reported in the news media, but few understand
these incidents to be within the scope of OSHA's regulatory mandate. In
fact, OSHA does have the authority to regulate workplace safety risks of
this nature.67 The need for intervention is underscored by data on
Id
63. Loh & Richardson, supra note 33, at 47 ("In manufacturing, foreign-born workers'
share of employment increased by 22 percent, from 13 percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 2001
64. Equating its "production, transportation, and material moving" occupational
category with manufacturing, the BLS reports that, in 2004, 17.5% of the foreign-born
workforce was employed in manufacturing, compared with 12.1% of the native-born
workforce. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS AND OCCUPATIONS (2004), available

at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/may/wk2/artO5.htm. Similar data were reported in
2005 (17% compared to 12%), 2006 (16.7% compared to 11.9%), 2007 (16.2% compared to
11.7%), and 2008 (16.4% compared to 11.5%). Labor Force Characteristics in 2008, supra
note 32, at 2; Labor Force Characteristics in 2007, supra note 32, at 2; Labor Force
Characteristics in 2006, supra note 32, at 2; Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 2005, at 10
tbl.4 (Apr. 14, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/forbrn04142006.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Press Release, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Immigrants in the Labor Market
2 (June 2008) (noting that more immigrants work in manufacturing than in any other
industry in California), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTFImmigrants
LaborJTF.pdf.
66. Store Clerk Killed in Apparent Robbery, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, http://articles.
latimes.com/1999/aug/10/local/me-64398.
67. OSHA's limited regulatory activity in this area has focused on preventing
workplace violence. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION,
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workplace fatalities: in the retail trade, the largest number of fatalities
occurs in convenience or grocery stores.6" Gasoline stations and gasoline
station convenience stores also register significant numbers of fatalities, as
do automobile dealers and automotive parts sellers.6 9 Between 2003 and
2006, the number of fatalities occurring at gasoline stations doubled.7 °
Many of the fatalities in the retail trade -particularly in convenience
stores and similar establishments-are attributable to violent criminal
activity. In urban centers, and, increasingly, in other parts of the country,
immigrant workers tend to occupy these vulnerable positions.7 1
B. Gaps in Existing OccupationalSafety andHealth Data
"'When you get hurtyou shut your mouth. The only thing that
could happen is that the employer gives you medicine or
something. You go to the doctor and pay with your money,
even though you don't have enough, right?
But just to avoid
72
"
yourjob.
losing
void
a
to
complaining,

"The reason why I think [workers] don't report [injuries or
illnesses]is because they're not aware of... theirrights. They
don't report it also because there's a language barrier. And,
because they won't get paid... They probably feel like they
have to be dying in bed in orderto reportit. ""
The data culled by the BLS and independent advocacy groups, while
helpful, does not provide a full picture of workplace injuries and fatalities
among immigrant workers.
Underreporting by both workers and
employers, along with limitations in the BLS's data gathering and
reporting protocols, render the existing data incomplete. Moreover, one
must look beyond the broad category of "foreign-born workers" to specific
www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3l53.html.
68. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TABLE A-2: FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM TRANSPORTATION INCIDENTS AND HOMICIDES,

ALL UNITED STATES 10 (2007),

available athttp://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftbO224.pdf.

69. Id.at 9-10.
70. OCCUPATIONAL

FATALITIES 2003-2006, supra note 47, at 20.
71. See Maya Rao, Fearon the Night Shift for South Asian Immigrants at New Jersey
Gas Stations,PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 30, 2008, at Al ("Gas stations are frequently manned
by South Asian immigrants .... ").

72. MARIANNE P. BROWN,
UCLA LABOR OCCUPATIONAL

ALEJANDRA DOMENZAIN & NELLIANA VILLORIA-SIEGERT,
SAFETY & HEALTH PROGRAM, VOICES FROM THE MARGINS:
IMMIGRANT WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 17

(2002) (quoting Ofelia, a 65-year-old domestic worker) (on file with author).
73. Id. at 18 (quoting Marianela, a 38-year-old homecare worker).
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demographic characteristics-namely, age, gender, and work experiencethat may influence workers' susceptibility to hazards, and, in turn, the
overall trends.
1. Underreportingof Injuries and FatalitiesAmong Immigrant Workers
Although the statistics regarding foreign-born workers are alarming, it
is likely that injury and death rates for immigrant workers are
undercounted due to inhibitions on the part of workers74 and a lack of
incentives for employers to report. With insecure immigration status,
restricted ability to work,7 5 or a lack of marketable job skills, immigrant
workers are less likely to report injuries or aggressively pursue the
reporting and investigation of fatalities of family members or colleagues.76
Although many immigrant workers may be inhibited from reporting out of
fear of immigration consequences or termination from their jobs,77 others
are simply unaware of the range of protections and benefits available to
non-citizens in the areas of occupational safety and health.7"
As for employers, some may be unaware of a reporting requirement,
while others may fail to report if they find the reporting provisions of the
OSH Act to be unclear.79 Other employers, however, may make the
tactical choice not to report given the possibility that they may not be
caught and the (relatively) minimal penalties if they are. In this vein, many
community groups interviewed by the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Labor have opined that the penalty for willfully failing to

74. See id at 41 (describing a survey of seventy-five low-wage immigrant workers in
the Los Angeles area, which found that 37% of those injured or ill from work did not
report their injuries or illnesses to their supervisors).
75. There are several categories of visas that allow foreign nationals to perform certain
types of work in the United States for a specified period of time. See U.S. Dep't of State,
Temporary Workers, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types-1271.html#1 (last visited
Aug. 30, 2009) (providing an overview of the different temporary worker visas issued by the
State Department).
76. See HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 9, at 12 (citing various studies showing that
immigrants are less likely to report workplace injuries and illnesses due to language barriers
and fear of employer retaliation resulting in deportation or job termination). See also
IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 7-8 (highlighting disincentives for
contingent and temporary immigrant workers to report workplace injuries).
77. Immigrant workers have, in fact, been terminated for reporting injuries on the job.
See, e.g., Kerry Hall, Ames Alexander & Franco Ordonez, The Cruelest Cuts.- The Human
Cost ofBringingPoultryto Your Table, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2008, at 1A.
78. See BROWN, DOMENZAIN & VILLORIA-SIEGERT, supra note 72, at 41 (reporting
that while most immigrant workers were informed and aware of the specific safety hazards
of their jobs, "virtually none said that the employer had legal responsibility for health and
safety in the workplace," and many thought that their immigration status rendered them
ineligible for workplace protections related to health and safety).

79. JOHN MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN
ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY

ECONOMIC

AND

POLITICAL

138 (1979).
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report a workplace death-currently capped at $70,000-is simply not a
strong enough incentive to report a fatality.8" An additional factor that
likely contributes to underreporting is the employment of significant
numbers of immigrant workers in the "informal" economy, where there is
little training, high turnover, and a fundamental lack of accountability for
employers-in short, where immigrant labor is treated as an expendable
commodity.8 1
2. Limitations of the BLS's Data
As noted above, the data that are reported by the BLS do not provide
a complete picture of the injuries and illnesses experienced by foreignborn workers in the United States.82 Specifically, the data available do not
capture the numbers, or proportion, of non-fatal occupational injuries and
illnesses that are borne by foreign-born workers.8 3 With respect to fatal
injuries, OSHA did not begin to gather detailed information about
immigrant worker fatalities until April 2002.' And although OSHA has
made advances in its fatality-related data collection and reporting over the
last seven years, significant gaps in the data still exist.85
80. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. See also 29 U.S.C. §
666(a) (2006) (setting the maximum penalty at $70,000).
81. CAL. WORKING IMMIGRANT SAFETY & HEALTH COAL., IMPROVING HEALTH AND
SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR CALIFORNIA'S IMMIGRANT WORKERS

14 (2002) [hereinafter

CAL.

WISH REPORT], availableat http://www.lohp.org/graphics/pdf/wishrept.pdf.
82. See Lenore S. Azaroff, Charles Levenstein & David H. Wegman, Occupational
Health of Southeast Asian Immigrants in a US. City: A Comparison of Data Sources, 93
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 593, 593 (2003) ("The United States lacks a comprehensive
occupational health surveillance system. Researchers rely on data collection systems...
[that] fail to capture most work-related illnesses and many work-related injuries, especially
those affecting low-wage, immigrant, and contingent workers.").
83. See generally U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Injuries,
Illnesses, and Fatalities, http://www.bls.gov/iif (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (reporting fatal
injuries suffered by foreign-born workers and non-fatal injuries based on race but not
country of origin).
84. In April 2002, OSHA modified the OSHA-170 form to include questions related to
ethnicity and language of the affected workers. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT,
supra note 3, at 11. The OSHA-170 form is used by inspectors and compliance officers
when reporting on fatalities and catastrophic injuries. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 11-14 (2009)
[hereinafter OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL], available at http://www.osha.gov/
OshDoc/Directive-pdfCPL02-00-148.pdf.
OSHA has since created the IMMLANG
Questionnaire, which is likewise used to track information related to fatalities among
foreign-born workers. Id. at 11-15.
85. Pursuant to an April 26, 2002, Memorandum, OSHA compliance officers are
required to complete a separate form when an immigrant worker, a Hispanic worker, or a
person of limited English proficiency is involved in a fatality or other workplace
catastrophe. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. See also Press
Release, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Announces
Plans to Improve Identification of Hispanic, Other Immigrant Worker Fatalities (Apr. 26,
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One example of such a gap is the lack of accessible information on the
relative size (in terms of number of employees) of the workplace where
the fatality occurred. Given the heavy representation of foreign-born
workers in the informal and underground economies, many immigrants
work for smaller employers, including subcontractors for larger firms, in
restaurants, and in private households.86 This is significant, as smaller
employers often lack the resources and expertise to improve safety
practices. Moreover, because smaller outfits tend to have abbreviated lifecycles, they typically have less incentive to improve the safety
infrastructure of their workplaces. In addition, smaller firms are typically
less concerned about negative publicity or backlash from consumers.87
Wider availability and dissemination of these data would provide a more
nuanced picture of the issues affecting immigrant workers and would allow
for more effective targeting of OSHA's regulatory activities.
The BLS has also been criticized for fundamental flaws in its data
collection and reporting mechanisms. The BLS's annual Survey of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) is not a comprehensive tally of
injuries and illnesses. While it is designed to provide a representative
sample of employers, studies undertaken in recent years have found that
the SOII undercounts injuries and illnesses by anywhere from 33% to
69%.88 Moreover, employers have an incentive to underreport, as high
injury or illness rates may trigger an inspection by OSHA.8 9 These
weaknesses in the BLS's data collection and reporting mechanisms
strongly suggest that the trends in immigrant worker fatalities, injuries, and
illnesses-while already troubling-may implicate an even greater number
of workers than the BLS's numbers indicate.
3. Demographics of the Immigrant Workforce That Affect Injury and
FatalityRates
Even when data sets specific to foreign-born workers are made
available, these data sets must be further disaggregated to account for
specific worker characteristics that may heighten vulnerability to

2002), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=
NEWSRELEASES&pid=1252. Since this public pronouncement in 2002, however,
OSHA has made few public declarations about the data they have collected or trends they
have observed.
86. See

IMMANUEL NESS, IMMIGRANTS, UNIONS, AND THE NEW U.S. LABOR MARKET

22-23, 25 (2005).
87. See

FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND "PUNISH OR PERSUADE"

9, 131-37 (1997).
88. HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 9, at 8.
89. Id. at 14. See also infra Sections II-III (describing OSHA's inspections and
enforcement procedures, and detailing flaws in those procedures).
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workplace hazards. For example, as a general matter, inexperienced
workers typically have higher injury rates than workers who are more
familiar with their jobs and the tasks involved.9" Although there is limited
data comparing the training afforded to immigrant workers with that of
their native-born counterparts,9 1 a number of factors would likely
contribute to deficient training, including language barriers and employer
attitudes towards immigrant labor.9 2 Moreover, although the BLS's data
do not distinguish between casual labor/day labor and longer-term
employment, some independent reports suggest high rates of injury among
immigrant day laborers. 93 Unsurprisingly, adequate training is rarely
offered to these workers.94
Gender and age may also influence the patterns of fatalities and
injuries among foreign-born workers. Young male workers tend to have
very high injury rates, in part because they are given more hazardous jobs,
and in part because they tend to be less risk averse and behave more
recklessly. 95 This finding is consistent with data from other areas of
scholarly inquiry, which suggest that men are more risk prone than women
in certain aspects of everyday life. 96
Although demographic data regarding the foreign-born population in
the United States are often incomplete or unreliable, the BLS's data, along
with data regarding migration patterns, suggest that the foreign-born
workforce has a higher proportion of males than females 97 and leans
towards younger workers.9" As explored more fully below, this does not
90. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 100.
91. IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 8 (reporting a lack of training in
the "informal" economy, where immigrant workers predominate); CAL. WISH REPORT,

supra note 81, at 13 (noting that most Latino immigrant workers who enroll in university
training programs have not received even the most basic chemical safety training from their
employers).
92. See also infra Section III (describing some shortcomings of OSHA's training
efforts).
93. ABEL VALENZUELA, JR., NIK THEODORE, EDWIN MELENDEZ & ANA Luis
GONZALEZ, UCLA CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF URBAN POVERTY, ON THE CORNER: DAY
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/

uploaded-files/NatlDayLabor-On theCornerl.pdf.

94. See id.
95. MENDELOFF, supranote 79, at 101.

96. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Smoking, Seat Belts, and Other Risky ConsumerDecisions.Differences by Gender and Race, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 481 (1996)
(concluding that "women choose safer products than men" and "women tend to be
employed in safer industries and in safer jobs within industries"). Hersch also explores how
race and economic status intersect with gender to influence individual behavior. This
article focuses on failures in the regulatory regime; a fuller discussion of worker choice will
be reserved for the second component of the three-part scholarly project described in the
Introduction.
97. Labor Force Characteristics in 2008, supra note 32.
98. Id.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

2009]

A NEW VISIONFOR WORKPLACE REGULATION

501

suggest that country of origin is inconsequential to the workplace safety
calculus. Rather, the more logical conclusion is that gender and age are
factors that bring into relief the challenges posed by national origin.
Having considered the limitations and complications of the existing
data, the statistical and anecdotal evidence still suggest a troublesome
trend of occupational fatalities and injuries among foreign-born workers,
especially those of Latino origin. The sections that follow explore the
contributing role of OSHA as reflected in its history, structure, and
operations.
II.
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: HISTORY, MANDATE,
AND STRUCTURE

In examining the root causes of the trends in workplace fatalities and
injuries among immigrants, a natural starting point is OSHA, the federal
agency charged with protecting the nation's workers.99 OSHA's core
responsibilities are to establish and enforce laws and regulations related to
workplace safety and health." In order to better understand the roots of
OSHA's current deficiencies, it is helpful to briefly examine the history of
OSHA and the OSH Act. In this section, I look at that history and then
describe the basic structure and operations of the agency.
A. A BriefHistory of OSHA and the OSH Act
1. The "Regulation" of Workplace Safety Before OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, enacted in 1970,0 marked
the culmination of nearly a century of organized activism related to
workplace safety and health in the United States. With the arrival of the
industrial revolution, and the accompanying mechanization of work that
introduced new dangers to the low-wage workforce, the call for worker

99. OSHA maintains its principal office within the Department of Labor in
Washington, D.C., and also operates ten regional offices across the continental United
States. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2008/2009, at 288 (2008), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2008-government-manual&docid=
214669tx-xxx-46.pdf.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006); DON J. LOFGREN, DANGEROUS PREMISES: AN INSIDER'S
VIEW OF OSHA'S ENFORCEMENT 1 (1989). Apart from setting standards and enforcing
them, OSHA also engages in education and training efforts among workers and health and
safety professionals. See infra Section II.B.4.
101. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-700 (2006)).
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protections intensified. The growing strength of unions around the turn of
the century and in the early part of the twentieth century facilitated the
passage of important factory safety legislation.1 °2
Despite growing awareness of workplace hazards, responsibility for
regulating workplace safety and health was still left to individual states.
States often fell short of adequately addressing workplace hazards: many
states failed to devote adequate resources to effectively combat
occupational fatalities and injuries, while other states' laws left large
numbers of workers without any protection."a 3
Enforcement efforts by the states were spotty and undermined by
weak laws. 1" Prior to the OSH Act, many state regulators perceived their
role to be "to educate employers" about workplace safety matters, but not
to obtain full compliance or modify the economic incentives that
employers faced by imposing harsh sanctions.
Although states did
6 for
occasionally resort to criminal trials to redress workplace fatalities,"
most workplace safety and health violations, even fines were rare. 0 7
2. The Pushfor FederalOversight
Activism in the late 1960s, spurred on by a series of public incidents,
began to turn the tide in the regulation of workplace safety and health.
Around this time, movements emerged that drew attention to specific
workplace hazards, including the "black lung" phenomenon among coal
miners 1 8 and the incidence of "brown lung" disease among textile and
other mill workers. °9 The immediate spark for federal legislative activity

102. Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers' Safety and Health, 18771917 § 2 (unpublished monograph, available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/
history/mono-regsafepart02.htm).
103. JOSEPH A. PAGE & MARY-WIN O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES: RALPH NADER'S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB 70 (1973) (noting the BLS's estimate
that, in 1969, "9.8 percent of the total American workers (with the exception of private
household employees) fell completely outside any sort of safety protection afforded by
state authority" and that twenty-eight states "left ... agricultural workers .. without any
legal protection against work hazards").
104. Some state inspectors lacked the enforcement authority needed to immediately
correct workplace hazards. In 1969, twenty-one states did not authorize inspectors to
immediately shut down machinery when an imminent hazard was discovered. Id. at 72.
105. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 1; PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 74
(observing that states approached the enforcement of safety codes with the philosophy
"that corporate lawbreakers should not be penalized, but merely warned, in order to give
them the opportunity for 'voluntary compliance' with safety regulations").
106. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 1.

107. Id at 83-85.
108. Id. at 17-18.
109. THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 34 (1993).
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was a mine blast in Farmington, West Virginia, in November 1968, which
killed seventy-eight miners and received national media attention."' As
public scrutiny of these issues increased and calls for a federal response
grew stronger, the Nixon administration saw an opportunity to assuage the
public's concerns while also shoring up the support of some key
constituencies, including working-class Democratic voters and organized
labor. " '
As late as the mid-1960s, occupational safety and health did not figure
prominently on the political agenda for organized labor.112 That began to
change in the late 1960s.
At the 1967 AFL-CIO Convention, the
organization endorsed a report on worker health and safety, entitled
Protecting Eighty Million American Workers, which called for federal
workplace safety protections.'13 The AFL-CIO repeated its call for federal
oversight in 1969, when it adopted Resolution 229 relating to the same
issue.14 By 1970, organized labor began to prioritize a comprehensive
workplace safety bill." 5
As different versions of the legislation were introduced, unions played
a prominent advocacy role.1 6 Following a period of intense negotiations,
the OSH Act, also known as the Williams-Steiger Act, 117 was signed into
law by President Nixon on December 29, 1970.118
To provide some context for this history of OSHA: during this period
of American history, immigrants comprised 4.7% of the total U.S.
population." 9 Despite these relatively modest numbers, in the late 1960s

110. MENDELOFF,

supra note 79, at 17; Associated Press, Deadly Explosion in 1968

Led to Mine SafetyLaws, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 1988, at 7A.
111. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 34.

112. Id. at 17.
113. James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions: Victims of Their Political
Success, 22 J. LAB. RES. 261, 268 (2001) (citing CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK:
THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 72 (1986)).
114. Id. (citing AFL-CIO, PROCEEDINGS 340-41 (1969)).

115. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 18. Political considerations partly explained the
sudden prominence of workplace safety on the unions' agenda. One of the most vocal
supporters of federal legislation was I.W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers of
America. Abel may have been motivated by his alliance with the United Mine Workers of
America or by emerging health and safety concerns within his own union. Id
116. PAGE &

O'BRIEN,

supranote 103, at 175-79.

117. Jon Charles Bradbury, Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety Evidence
from OSHA Enforcement, 1981-1995,29 J. REG. ECON. 211, 213 (2006).

118. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-700 (2006)).
119. Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, HistoricalCensus Statisticson the ForeignBorn Population of the United States. 1850-1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census Population
Division, Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/documentation/twps0029/twpsOO29.html. At that time, statistics about the foreignborn workforce were not maintained by the Department of Labor. U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Force Characterization of Foreign-Born Workers
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and early 1970s, the plight of immigrant workers nevertheless received
some public attention due to the vigorous organizing activity of the United
Farm Workers Organizing Committee of the AFL-CIO. 20 In fact, in the
months before the OSH Act was signed, thousands of immigrant farm
workers in California went on strike. 121 Despite this visibility, the advocacy
that led to the passage of the OSH Act-and the narratives that fueled
public support for workplace safety legislation-had little connection with
the foreign-born workforce. 2 2 It is telling that in the key reports
comprising the legislative history of the OSH Act, the terms
"immigrant(s)," "immigrant worker(s)," and "foreign-born" are never
mentioned.123
B. Structure and Operationsof OSHA
The OSH Act sets out a broad mandate for the promotion and
protection of occupational safety and health. The stated purpose of the
OSH Act is "to assure so far as possible [for] every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."' 24 The OSH
Act includes a general duty clause, which requires every employer to
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to
1' 25
employees.
his
to
harm
physical
serious
or
cause death
The OSH Act also calls for the establishment of the National Advisory
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health, a twelve-member body
Technical Note, http://www.bis.gov/news.release/forbrn.tn.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
120. United Farm Workers, UFW Chronology, http://www.ufw.org/_page.php?menu=
research&inc=_page.php?menu=research&inc=history/O1.html (last visited Aug. 30,2009).
121. SUSAN FERRISS & RICARDO SANDOVAL, THE FIGHT IN THE FIELDS: CESAR
CHAVEZ AND THE FARMWORKER MOVEMENT 159-60 (1997).

122. See, e.g., COMMON BORDER, UNCOMMON PATHS: RACE AND CULTURE IN U.S.MEXICAN RELATIONS 88-90 (Jaime E. Rodrfguez 0. & Kathryn Vincent eds., 1997)
(discussing how the Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union's failure to adapt to
demographic changes caused by increased immigration in southern California led to an
overall decline in union membership).
123. See S. REP. No. 91-1282 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177; H.R. REP.
No. 91-1765 (1970) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5228.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). Note, however, that the OSH Act exempts certain
categories of employees, including federal workers and state and federal government
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2006). Another notable exception is the exclusion of
household domestic workers from OSHA protections. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2007). This
exclusion particularly affects immigrant women of color, who predominate in these
occupations in many parts of the country.
See DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED &
DATACENTER, HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS: INSIDE NEW YORK'S DOMESTIC WORK
INDUSTRY 2 (2006) ("99% of domestic workers in New York are foreign-born . . . [,]

[n]inety-five percent . . . are people of color, and 93%
http://www.datacenter.org/reports/homeiswheretheworkis.pdf.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).

are women"), available at
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"composed of representatives of management, labor, occupational safety
and occupational health professions, and of the public."1" 6 The Committee
serves in a general advisory role to the Secretary of Labor in her
administration of the OSH Act.
1. Promulgationof Standards
One of OSHA's core responsibilities is the promulgation of
regulations (commonly known as "standards") related to occupational
safety and health. By the late 1960s, on the eve of the OSH Act's passage,
many standards relating to workplace safety and health already existed.
Some of these standards had been codified in federal law and were being
enforced by the Department of Labor.12 7 Under § 4(b)(2) of the OSH Act,
a few of these federal standards were automatically incorporated into the
new regulatory structure with the adoption of the OSH Act. Another set
of standards, commonly known as the "consensus" standards, were
guidelines developed largely by industry representatives with some
contributions, and, ultimately, assent from government and organized
labor." 8 Congress sought to integrate these protections into the OSHA
framework by requiring the Secretary of Labor to promulgate "any
national consensus standard, and any established
Federal standard" within
129
two years of the effective date of the OSH Act.
The consensus and federal standards were promulgated by OSHA on
May 29, 1971.13° Observers criticized the "hasty and wholesale adoption"
of the standards, which, in some cases, contained errors, were inapplicable
to health and safety matters, were vague, or had been misprinted by
OSHA in its posting in the Federal Register."' Regrettably, the disorder
of these initial standards contributed to OSHA's reputation among
employers for promulgating, and seeking to enforce, arbitrary or
inconsequential standards. 132 Ironically, while OSHA was disparaged for
its haste in issuing these initial standards, in subsequent decades the
133
agency has been criticized for excessive delays in the rulemaking process.
Since the passage of the OSH Act and the initial adoption of
126. 29 U.S.C. § 656(a)(1) (2006).
127. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 36. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 35(d) (2006)
(incorporating workplace safety considerations into the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act,
a piece of legislation passed in 1936 as part of the New Deal).
128. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 36.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2006).
130. National Consensus Standards and Established Federal Standards, 36 Fed. Reg.
10,466-10,714 (May 29, 1971); MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 38.
131. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 39.
132. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 37.
133. See infra Section III.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

N. YU. REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 33:479

standards, numerous regulations have been promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor, who is authorized to develop permanent standards. Pursuant to
§ 6(b)(1) of the OSH Act, the Secretary may propose, revoke, or modify a
standard whenever she "determines that a rule should be promulgated in
'
order to serve the objectives of this Act."134
Beyond these general
guidelines, however, there is no established priority-setting process for
OSHA regulations. The high-level administrators at OSHA are typically
political appointees; therefore, the focus of the standard-setting processand the general level of engagement on workplace safety issues-may vary
depending upon the administration in power.
Individuals who are adversely affected by an OSHA standard may
appeal its validity to the U.S. Court of Appeals, before which the
Secretary's determinations will hold "if supported by substantial
'
evidence"135
(note that although the OSH Act refers to the Secretary of
Labor, within the Department of Labor, decisions on standards are
delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health, the head of OSHA). 13 6 Furthermore, the OSH Act allows
employees or their representatives to initiate a rulemaking proceeding by
submitting a written petition to the Secretary of Labor.137
OSHA standards are meant, inter alia, to prescribe the use of
protective equipment, labels, and other safety measures, and to clarify safe
levels of exposure to potentially harmful particles and chemicals.
Employers have the obligation of complying with OSHA's standards,
which can only require conditions and practices "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" to provide safe or healthful employment.138 Given this
broadly worded guideline, employers have criticized the standard-setting
process for an insufficient focus on costs.139 Indeed, there is little concrete
guidance in the OSH Act regarding the appropriate weight to be given to
expenses when deciding upon new standards. 4 ° Employers may, however,
134. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 48.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2006). When reviewing the propriety of a "Section 6"
standard, courts typically look at the following factors: (1) whether the Secretary's notice of
proposed rulemaking adequately informed interested persons of the occupational safety
and health action taken; (2) whether the Secretary's promulgation adequately set forth
reasons for action; (3) whether the statement of reasons reflects consideration of factors
relevant under the statute; (4) whether presently available alternatives were at least
considered; and (5) if the Secretary's determination is based in whole or in part on factual
matters subject to evidentiary development, whether substantial evidence in the record as a
whole supports the determination. Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503
F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1974).
136. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 51.
137. § 655(b)(1); PAGE & O'BRIEN, supranote 103, at 185.
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 654(a)(2) (2006).
139. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 50.
140. The OSH Act alludes to questions of cost in the context of "standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents," noting that the Secretary of Labor is to set
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seek a permanent variance, or exception to compliance, from a standard if
another equal or better protective method of control is found. 4 1
In addition to the formal standard-setting process under § 6 of the
OSH Act, OSHA has a number of other regulatory "tools" in its toolbox
that allow the agency to establish guidelines for workplace safety and
health matters. OSHA issues interpretations, in which it clarifies the
applicability of existing standards to specific factual circumstances in
response to questions posed by employers or their counsel. OSHA also
has the authority to issue directives, which are agency driven and provide
more detailed guidance on specific standards and OSHA programs.
Finally, negotiated rulemaking is a process by which industry and labor
representatives convene to develop mutually agreeable "consensus"
standards, which then can be approved by OSHA in a relatively
expeditious manner. 4 2
To inform the rulemaking process, the OSH Act created the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which was situated
within the agency now known as the Department of Health and Human
Services.143 The mandate of NIOSH is to conduct research and analysis
upon which OSHA can base its occupational safety and health standards.1"
NIOSH is also authorized to educate and train workers and members of
the public on workplace safety and health issues.145
2. Worksite Inspections and ReportingRequirements
The OSH Act details procedures for enforcing the OSH Act and its
accompanying regulations through inspections, investigations, and the

standards that protect workers "to the extent feasible." § 655(b)(5). This ambiguous
standard has been the subject of litigation. See BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY,
LAW & POLICY 509-19 (1984).
141. § 655(d); LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 1. In addition to permanent variances,
OSHA grants temporary variances, experimental variances, and variances for national
security purposes. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
FACT SHEET: VARIANCES FROM OSHA STANDARDS (2002), available at http://
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/dataGeneralFacts/VarianceFactS.pdf.
142. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
143. LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 1. Prior to the passage of the OSH Act, a
predecessor agency had been charged with some of the duties currently performed by
NIOSH. The Bureau of Occupational Safety and Health (BOSH), housed within the thenexisting Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "suppl[ied] technical assistance to
public and private groups engaged in efforts to improve levels of job health and safety."
PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 88. BOSH, in turn, had been preceded by the Division
of Occupational Health. Id. at 90.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (2006).
145. LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 1. See also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH)
FACT SHEET (2003), available athttp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/2003-116.pdf.
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imposition of penalties. 4 6
OSHA worksite inspections are broadly
categorized as either "programmed" or "unprogrammed" inspections. 47
Programmed inspections are planned inspections; OSHA may proactively
initiate an inspection based on injury or fatality rates for a particular
employer or industry. 148 Two programs provide the architecture for
OSHA's programmed inspections: (1) the Site-Specific Targeting (SST)
Program and (2) the Special Emphasis Programs, which include national,
regional, and local efforts. SST relies on OSHA data from the prior year
to develop a programmed inspection plan for non-construction worksites
with forty or more employees that have registered high rates of injuries
and illnesses. 149 OSHA's Special Emphasis Programs target industries and
hazards that are deemed to pose a particular risk to workers in a certain
locality, region, or nationwide.15
Unprogrammed inspections are triggered by allegations of hazardous
working conditions, as conveyed by: reports of an imminent danger,
fatality, or catastrophe at the worksite; confidential worker complaints; or
referrals from other government departments or agencies."'
OSHA
prioritizes unprogrammed inspections, with its principal focus on imminent
dangers. 15 2 Under certain circumstances, if a worksite fatality has
occurred, or if other serious violations have been found, an employer may
be placed under OSHA's Enhanced Enforcement Program (EEP). An
EEP designation calls for follow-up inspections, agency engagement with
company leadership, and vigorous enforcement of penalties.153
146. The authority to conduct inspections, issue citations, and impose penalties derives
from 29 C.F.R. § 1903.1 (2007).
147. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
148. Id. See LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 2.
149. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. 09-05
(CPL 02): Site-Specific Targeting 2009, at 6 (July 20, 2009), available at http://
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive-pdf/CPL 02 09-05.pdf.
150. Id
The seven National Emphasis Programs currently in place focus on
amputations, lead, crystalline silica, shipbreaking, trenching/excavations, petroleum
refinery process safety management, and combustible dust. Id. Approximately 140 Local
and Regional Emphasis Programs also have been approved by OSHA. Id
151. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 2-8, 9-2, 9-3. A
complaint that is in writing, signed, and sets forth the grounds for the complaint with some
specificity will trigger an on-site inspection. ROBERT D. PETERSON & JOEL M. COHEN,
COMPLETE GUIDE TO OSHA COMPLIANCE 66 (1995). On-site inspections may also be
warranted under other circumstances. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Federal OSHA Complaint Handling Process, http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/
worker/handling.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
152. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 5; OSHA's FIELD
OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 2-4. OSHA prioritizes inspections as follows: "(1)
reports of imminent dangers, (2) fatalities or accidents serious enough to send three or
more workers to the hospital, (3) employee complaints and referrals from other
government agencies, and (4) targeted inspections." OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT,
supra note 3, at 5.
153. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. CPL
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An OSHA inspection is typically conducted in three phases: (1) an
opening conference; (2) the inspection (or "walkaround"), and (3) a
closing conference.5
During the opening conference, the Compliance
Safety and Health Officer meets with an employer representative and an
employee representative (if available) and explains the role of OSHA, as
well as the rights and responsibilities of the different parties. The
inspector typically provides an overview of what will occur during the
inspection.'55
During this initial conference, the inspector may ask
questions to learn more about the company and its operations. The
inspector will request documentation and records related to workplace
health and safety, including the OSHA 300 Form, which is used by most
15 6
employers to record injuries and illnesses.
During the walkaround, the inspector will visually examine the
premises, with an eye to violations of OSHA standards. The inspector
may also conduct tests and privately interview employees during the
inspection. 57 The inspection concludes with a closing conference, during
which the inspector presents her findings. If the inspector has found a
violation, she may issue a citation at the closing conference, or soon
thereafter. 58 She may alternatively choose to conduct further inspections
and testing at a later date.159 If the inspector issues a citation, it must be
posted in the workplace and indicate the underlying violations."6
The OSH Act allows both the employer and an "employee
representative" to accompany the OSHA representative during all phases
02-00-145: Enhanced Enforcement Program (Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://
www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=DIRECTIVES&p-id=3749#
XI.
154. LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 2. Depending on the intended scope of the
inspection, it will be either "comprehensive" or "partial." OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS
MANUAL, supra note 84, at 3-6. A comprehensive inspection is defined as "a substantially
complete and thorough inspection of all potentially hazardous areas of the establishment"
whereas a "partial inspection is one whose focus is limited to certain potentially hazardous
areas, operations, conditions or practices at the establishment." Id.
155. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS

MANUAL,

supranote 84, at 3-6.

156. Id. at 2-3. The OSHA 300 Form ("Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses")
is used to log incidents in workplaces with eleven or more employees. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1904.1,
1904.29 (2007). When requested by a government representative, a copy of the log must be
provided within four business hours. § 1904.40. Note that smaller employers-defined as
employers that had no more than ten employees at any point in time during the prior
calendar year-are not required to maintain a record for injuries and illnesses for the
current year. § 1904.1; PETERSON & COHEN, supra note 151, at 6.

157. LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 3. OSHA procedures require that "interviews of
non-managerial employees ... be conducted in private." OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS
MANUAL, supra note 84, at 3-24.
158. LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 3.
159. See generally LOFGREN, supra note 100 (describing inspections of the mortuary
and other workplaces where multiple tests were conducted over a period of months before
citations were issued).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 658(b) (2006); MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 2.
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of a workplace inspection."' The OSH Act contains statutory protections
for workers who face retaliation for exercising their rights under the OSH
Act. 6 2
As part of its inspection regime, OSHA has introduced the OSHA
Consultation Program, which allows employers to request a free visit by an
OSHA inspector without the risk of incurring fines.163 The program is
targeted at small and mid-sized employers. OSHA works with these
employers over a series of visits to correct violations of OSHA
standards. 1" A component of the consultation program is the Safety and
Health Achievement Recognition Program (SHARP), an incentive-based
program that similarly requires an on-site consultation and a commitment
to meet certain benchmarks. 165 Another important piece of OSHA's
compliance efforts is the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), under
which employers make a formal commitment to implement systems to
reduce health and safety risks in the workplace.1 66 Although some studies
have demonstrated the effectiveness of these "voluntary compliance"
approaches, further analysis is needed.'6 7
3. Enforcement Provisions
The OSH Act provides for civil and criminal penalties in cases where
it is determined that an employer has violated the OSH Act or agency
standards. Violations are categorized as "serious," "other-than-serious,"

161. 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (2006); LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 1. In practice, some
employers have chafed at the presence of an employee representative, especially when
citations are discussed. See, e.g., id. at 62 (recounting a closing conference during which the
employer asked that the union representative be excused for the discussion of fines).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006); MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 2. The protections
include the possibility of reinstatement or back pay.
163. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA
FACT SHEET: THE OSHA CONSULTATION PROGRAM, available at http://www.osha.gov/
OshDoc/dataGeneral Facts/factsheet-consultations.pdf.
164. Id.

165. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Safety and
Health

Achievement

Recognition

Program

(SHARP),

http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/

smallbusiness/sharp.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
166. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA
FACT SHEET: VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS (2009), available at http://
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data-GeneralFacts/factsheet-vpp.pdf.
OSHA conducts a
comprehensive on-site review for new VPP participants and subsequently conducts periodic
reviews. Id. In exchange for participating in the VPP, employers are removed from the list

of OSHA's programmed inspection sites. Id.
167. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: OSHA's
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS, BUT SHOULD BE FULLY
EVALUATED

BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED

(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d04378.pdf.
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or involving "imminent danger., 168 If an imminent danger is found, the
169
Secretary of Labor is authorized to seek immediate injunctive relief.
OSHA may also impose monetary penalties of up to $7000 for "serious"
and "other-than-serious" violations. aT
In the event of a "serious"
violation-defined as one where "a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result" and where the employer either knew
about or "with the exercise of reasonable diligence" should have known
about the violation -a penalty is mandatory. 171 If a violation is found to be
willful, 172 the agency may issue a fine of between $5000 and $70,000.1'
Failure to correct the violation within the period of time specified by
OSHA may result in additional fines. 74
The OSH Act also allows for criminal penalties for willful violations
that result in an employee's death. Under § 17(e) of the OSH Act, if an
employer intentionally disregards or is plainly indifferent to safety
standards (or an OSHA rule or order) and a fatal accident results, the
employer may be fined up to $250,000 (for an individual employer) or
$500,000 (for 76 organizational employers)1 75 and/or charged with a
misdemeanor.1
Once OSHA assesses a baseline penalty, the penalty amount may be
reduced under certain circumstances. The size of the employer may allow
for a 60% penalty reduction, a 35% reduction may be warranted if the
employer demonstrates "good faith," and a 10% adjustment may be

168. 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (2006) (creating penalties for violations involving imminent
danger, defined as "conditions or practices . .. such that a danger exists which could
reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the
imminence of such danger can be eliminated through [OSHA] enforcement procedures");
29 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (creating penalties for serous and non-serious violations of §§ 654-55
of OSHA); PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 183.
169. § 662(b).
170. § 666(b)-(c).
171. § 666(k). If a violation cannot be classified as a "serious" violation or one posing
an "imminent danger," it is deemed to be a "not serious" violation. § 666(c).
172. To be cited for a willful violation, an employer must have "demonstrated either
an intentional disregard for the requirements of the Act or a plain indifference to employee
safety and health." OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS

173. § 666(a)-(b).
174. § 666(d).

175. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS

MANUAL,

MANUAL,

supranote 84, at 4-28.

supra note 84, at 4-31.

Although the

actual text of the OSH Act capped the fine amount at $10,000 for a first-time offender, the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 increased the maximum fines for criminal OSHA
violations. Compare§ 666(e), with 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(4), (c)(4) (2006).
176. The maximum penalty is six months imprisonment or, if the violation is a repeat
offense, one year. § 666(e). In contrast, the maximum penalty for willfully endangering a
protected fish under the Clean Water Act is fifteen years imprisonment. Orly Lobel,
InterlockingRegulatory and IndustrialRelations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57
ADMIN L. REV. 1071, 1081-82 (2005). As described in Section III, infra, however, OSHA's
criminal penalties are rarely invoked.
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allowed depending on the prior history of violations at that worksite. 77
An employer may appeal an OSHA citation or penalty, 17 ' A separate
agency-the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC)-was created as an appellate body to review such appeals and
to serve as a check on OSHA's enforcement efforts. 179 The OSHRC may
affirm, modify, or vacate the penalty imposed by OSHA."s Employees
may also request review of a decision to not issue a citation or challenge
the amount of time an employer is given to correct a workplace hazard. 8'
A 1992 audit revealed that appeals typically led to a significant reduction
in the initial citation."
4. Education and Training
Apart from its standard-setting and enforcement efforts, OSHA
engages in a range of efforts related to training and education of workers,
health and safety professionals, and advocates. OSHA has established an
official training institute (the OSHA Training Institute (OTI), located in
the suburbs of Chicago) for federal, state, and private-sector personnel
who engage in inspection, education, and training related to occupational
safety and health. OSHA has extended the OTI's training opportunities to
individuals across the country through a network of OTI Education
Centers, which are local institutions designated by OSHA to offer specific
training courses. OSHA seeks to reach even more individuals through a
network of authorized trainers under the Outreach Training Program. 83
All of these training efforts respond, in part, to the view that workplace
fatalities and injuries will not be eradicated simply by promulgating ever-

177. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 6-9; OIG IMMIGRANT
FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.17(a) (2007); LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 4 (stating that an
employer may appeal "a citation, the penalty, and/or the abatement date").
179. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (2006); LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 1; MENDELOFF, supra note
79, at 2.
180. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
181. § 1903.17(b); Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Directive No. CPL 02-00-115: Complaint Policies and Procedures (June 14, 1996) (including
a sample letter to a complainant inviting a "review of the inspection results"), available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=DIRECTIVES&p-id=
1590; LOFGREN, supranote 100, at 4.
182. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. When employers
appealed initial citations for "egregious" violations, the administrative law judge who
reviewed the appeals downgraded 57% of those citations to "serious" or "other-thanserious" citations, and vacated 36% of them outright. Id.
183. See generally Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Directorate of Training and Education Training Resources, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/ote/
index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (providing information about the OTI from the
OSHA Directorate of Training Education and Training Resources).
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stricter standards.1 4
The OSH Act also requires all employers to provide a basic level of
training to employees on regulations that apply to all workplaces, such as
emergency and fire procedures and the use of personal protective
equipment.185 In the construction industry, where large numbers of
immigrant workers are employed, and where those workers experience
high fatality and injury rates, the applicable OSHA regulations require
training on specific topics." 6 Depending on the nature of the work and the
potential risks involved, different training requirements may apply.'8 7
To facilitate the education and training of workers by employers,
OSHA launched the Alliance Program in 2002. Under this program,
OSHA enters into formal partnerships with "employers, trade and
professional groups, labor unions, government agencies and educational
institutions" for training, education, and outreach to workers. 88 Specific
types of collaboration under the program include distribution of OSHA
informational materials, participation in forums related to workplace
safety, and development of training materials.189 As of July 2009, OSHA
had formed more than 470 partnerships under the Alliance Program. 9 °
184. PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 145. Without a doubt, certain incidents are
caused by errors or carelessness on the part of workers.

185. See generally OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN OSHA STANDARDS AND TRAINING GUIDELINES (1998);
PETERSON & COHEN, supra note 151, at 55.
186. These topics are:
(1) the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations
applicable to the work environment; (2) proper handling practices for the use of
poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances, and awareness training on
personal hygiene and personal protective equipment; (3) where harmful plants or
animals are present on the job site, what are the potential hazards, how to avoid
injury, and acceptable first aid procedures to be used in the event of injury; (4)
proper handling practices for flammable liquids, gases, or toxic materials; and (5)
if workers are required to enter into confined or enclosed spaces, the nature of
the hazards involved, and appropriate equipment to be used.
PETERSON & COHEN, supranote 151, at 55. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21 (2009).
187. OSHA training requirements vary depending on the regulation, but take four
principal forms: (1) "performance-oriented requirements," which require employers to
provide training when exposure limits for noise or contaminants are surpassed; (2) "on-site
requirements," which call for specific training, regardless of the level of exposure; (3)
"periodic training requirements," which call for recurring training related to specific
hazards, such as asbestos; and (4) "one-time training requirements." PETERSON & COHEN,
supra note 151, at 56.
188. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA

FACT SHEET: THE OSHA ALLIANCE PROGRAM (2005) [hereinafter OSHA ALLIANCE
PROGRAM],
available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/dataGeneralFacts/factsheetalliance.pdf.
189. Id.
190. OSHA Regional News Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
OSHA Launches Alliance with Morristown Neighborhood House to Focus on Workplace
Safety and Health (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
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5. Delegation ofAuthority to States and Territories
The OSH Act allows for state governments to play a central role in the
promotion of occupational safety and health and in the enforcement of
workplace standards. Pursuant to § 18 of the OSH Act, OSHA may
delegate primary enforcement authority to states, provided that the state
enforcement does not leave workers with less protection than federal
enforcement would give."' In practice, these "state-plan" states must
develop and operate their own occupational safety and health programs
and must show that their programmatic plans are, at a minimum, "at least
as effective" as the efforts of OSHA.192 The state plans must contain key
components, including standard setting, enforcement (with sufficient
personnel), protection of public employees, training, education, and
technical assistance.193 Where a state plan exists and has been approved,
OSHA may subsidize up to 50% of the state agency's operational costs. 94
Currently, twenty-four states and two U.S. territories have approved
state plans under OSHA.'9 5
Of these, four cover only public-sector
employees. 9 6 OSHA may decertify state plans that it deems to be
ineffective, and states may likewise withdraw their plans. 97 Despite these
provisions, "the distribution of federal OSHA and state-plan states has
remained virtually static since the 1970s."'1 9

owadisp.show document?pjtable=NEWS RELEASES&pjid=16101.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b)-(c) (2006). Delegating authority to the states is a multi-step
process. A state that wishes to avail itself of this provision must first prepare a
"developmental plan," which describes its regulatory infrastructure and ability to monitor
workplace safety and health matters, within three years' time. Bradbury, supra note 117, at
215. OSHA may then enter into an "operational status agreement" with the state-plan
state, followed by "final approval" within a year's time. Id.
192. § 667(c)(2).
193. § 667(c); PETERSON & COHEN, supra note 151, at 3.
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 672 (g), 673(c) (2006); MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 2. In practice,
however, there is typically not a precise, fifty/fifty division of costs due to a range of factors,
including the ability of some states to keep revenues from fines collected. See Alison D.
Morantz, Has Devolution InjuredAmerican Workers? State and FederalEnforcement of
ConstructionSafety, 25 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 183,184 n.2 (2009).
195. These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Frequently Asked Questions About State Occupational
Safety & Health Plans, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/faq.html#establishingyourown (last
visited Aug. 30, 2009).
196. These jurisdictions are Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and the Virgin
Islands. Id.
197. § 667(f).
198. Morantz, supra note 194, at 184.
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III.
THE REGULATORY REGIME AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS
In the decades since the creation of OSHA and the passage of the
OSH Act, OSHA has faced significant criticism. Indeed, the agency has
been described as "the paradigmatic case of bureaucratic inefficiency and
regulatory failure."1 9 9 Most observers agree that a number of factors have
frustrated the realization of OSHA's mandate: deeply politicized
regulatory behavior, inadequate resources, and a fundamentally flawed
structure for regulation and enforcement.2 Although political power and
the availability of resources have fluctuated depending on the governing
administration, structural flaws have consistently beleaguered OSHA. The
consequences have been low inspection rates, paltry penalties, and
infrequent prosecutions, which, in turn, have failed to significantly lower
workplace fatality and injury rates among the most isolated and vulnerable
workers.2"'
In this section, I will examine how the history, structure, and presentday operations of OSHA-described in Section II-have obscured the
workplace safety and health concerns of immigrants.2
A. OSHA 's Regulatory Agenda: Missing Voices ofImmigrant Advocates
As noted above, OSHA lacks a consistent, transparent process for
determining its annual priorities. Rather than relying upon arguably
objective criteria, such as statistics documenting trends in illnesses and
199. Lobel, supra note 176, at 1078.
200. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 208 (emphasizing that OSHA "badly
needs additional resources and a regulatory plan"). See generally Penalties for Worker
FatalitiesUnder the OccupationalSafety and Health Act: HearingBefore the S.Comm. on
Health,Education,Labor,andPensions,110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Peg Seminario,
Director of Safety and Health, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter 2008 Seminario Statement] ("[T]he
Occupational Safety and Health Act and the OSHA enforcement program provide little
deterrence to employers who put workers in danger."), available at http://help.senate.gov/
Hearings/2008 04 29/Seminario.pdf; Press Release, H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce,
Subcommittee Explores Flaws in OSHA Rulemaking Process (June 14, 2001) (quoting
attorney Willis Goldsmith, who testified that OSHA "has become so politicized over the
past several decades that stakeholders on all sides have lost confidence in the agency's
ability to thoroughly review evidence, promulgate responsible standards with clear
requirements, and to enforce those standards fairly and even-handedly"), available at
http://republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/press/presslO7/osha6l401.htm.
201. See generally 2008 Seminario Statement, supra note 200, at 2 (arguing that
penalties are weak even when workers are killed on the job, inspections are rare, and the
law as it currently stands relies largely on the good faith of the employer).
202. While this examination of OSHA's record vis-A-vis foreign-born workers may
shed light on the agency's shortcomings with regards to a particular subset of the
workforce, it also reveals limitations in OSHA's overall approach to workplace safety
regulation.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

516

N YU REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 33:479

fatalities, OSHA's regulatory agenda is shaped by interest group demands,
pressure from legislators and the executive branch, and information
gathered by its own staff and by other agencies.2" 3 As a result, the nature
of OSHA's regulatory activities is highly dependent upon the demands of
company and worker advocates. A natural consequence of this dynamic is
that immigrant workers, who often are not equal participants in the
political process or in the institutions that have leverage over that process,
are unable to marshal the attention and resources of OSHA regulators.
Among the institutions that have advocated for stronger protections
for workers, organized labor has played the most prominent role.
Historically, unions have been vigorous advocates for greater workplace
safety and health protections.2 " Unions have criticized OSHA for, inter
alia, its preoccupation with costs, its deference to employers, its meager
penalties, and its inadequate staff.2"5 Unions have also criticized OSHA
0 6
for delays in promulgating standards."
John Mendeloff, writing in the late 1970s, described the central role
that unions play in the regulatory regime:
In some respects the OSH Act relies on unions to activate it,
through worker complaints and surveillance of management, both
of which are more likely to occur at unionized workplaces, where
unions can use the act to gain leverage in bargaining. Yet if
OSHA were totally dependent upon worker invocations, it would

203. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, The New OSHA: Reinventing Worker Safety and Health,
NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV. B-6 (1995) (describing a "priority planning process" in which

OSHA solicited input from "more than 200 stakeholders in business, labor, professional
associations, and State government to identify the most pressing new priorities for agency
action").
204. James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions. Victims of Their Political
Success?, 22 J. LABOR RES. 261, 267-68 (2001) (describing how collective bargaining helped
to mitigate health and safety risks across a range of industries).
There are several ostensible reasons for unions' support for greater safety and health
protections, including, most notably, the welfare of their members and the political gains
that accompany the greater protections afforded to workers. In some respects, however,
OSH Act standards may actually undercut unions. Bennett and Taylor advance the
hypothesis that legislative and regulatory advances, which apply to all workers, will signal
to workers that they have less to gain by joining a union. Id at 261. Additionally, the
emphasis on eliminating workplace risks may create incentives to develop technology that,
in turn, may displace workers and reduce union membership. MENDELOFF, supra note 79,
at 75-76.
205. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 3-4.
206. Id. at 4 (describing union attacks on OSHA for delays in developing health
standards). See also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Scott P. Schneider,
Director of Occupational Safety and Health, Laborers' Health and Safety Fund of North
America), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/042407ScottSchneidertestimony.
pdf.
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largely fail to correct hazards at nonunion plants ....
Mendeloff's assertions are supported by more recent empirical data.
In at least one analysis of cases, OSHA allowed, for a shorter abatement
period (following workplace inspections) at unionized workplaces, as
compared with nonunionized workplaces. 2 8 One logical explanation for
this is that the union presence counterbalanced any deference shown to the
employer.20 9 Other studies have similarly demonstrated that employee
complaints to OSHA are more likely to occur at unionized workplaces; it is
possible that this is due in part to the added job security that unions
provide.21 ° Unionized firms are also likely to be cited for more violations
and to be required to correct violations more quickly.211
As described above, unions played a key role in advocating for the
passage of the OSH Act and quickly occupied a prominent role in
advocacy on occupational safety and health matters. Indeed, authors
writing in the late 1970s opined:
The organized labor movement is the Department of Labor's (and
OSHA's) chief client, and the department is expected to show at
least some partiality to the interests of organized labor. OSHA,
established at labor's behest, is overseen by congressional
committees dominated by the AFL-CIO and depends primarily
upon labor backing to ward off attacks upon its authority.212
Consistent with this view, it has been noted that those who benefited
most from OSHA were "overwhelmingly blue collar workers, mostly
'
unionized, and mostly men."213
Apart from simply protecting their own members, unions were called
upon to champion the cause of occupational safety and health for all
workers. These calls reflect the position that unions began to occupy in
the national consciousness vis-A-vis occupational safety and health
concerns:
The unions not only have responsibility for securing safer and
healthier work conditions for their own members by means of
collective bargaining, but they also have the opportunity to
advocate the cause of job safety and health for all workers through
MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 33.
208. Id. at 45.
209. Id.at 45-46.
210. Robert Scherer & Crystal L. Owen, OSHA Inspections:Process and Outcomes in
ProgrammedInspections Versus Complaint-InvestigatedInspections, 8 EMP. RESP. & RTS.

207.

J. 245, 251-52 (1995).

211. David Weil, Building Safety. The Role of Construction Unions in the
Enforcement of OSHA, 13 J. LAB. RES. 121,125 tbl.1, 128-29 (1992).
212. MENDELOFF, supranote 79, at 73-74.
213. Id, at 35.
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legislative activity and the fostering of a widespread public
14
awareness of the problem.
Since the late 1970s, however, unions have experienced a gradual
decline in their relative power and have suffered a concomitant decline in
their membership.215 Needless to say, as compared with the 1970s, unions
now exercise less leverage over OSHA. Nevertheless, unions continue to
occupy much of the space for worker safety advocates in the sphere of
OSHA's rulemaking and enforcement. This role is not simply political;
nor can it be inferred only from the history of workplace safety regulation.
Rather, the OSH Act has codified the role of unions through references to
"employee representative" or "representative of employees."216
'
The
legislative history, when viewed in the context of other occupational safety
and health regulations, strongly suggests that the drafters of the OSH Act
equated "employee representative" with "union representative." ''
Unions continue to take leadership roles in workplace safety efforts,
and nearly every prominent national union has personnel dedicated to
protecting workers from on-the-job hazards. This advocacy has become a

214. PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 115-16.

215. Thomas B. Edsall, Labor's Divisions Widen as Membership Declines, WASH.
Mar. 7, 2005, at A2 (noting that while the statistical decline in union membership had
begun earlier, it "had become evident by the early 1970s"). See also U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Chart: Union Membership Has Declined over Time,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2006/chart3-11.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (reflecting a
gradual decline in union membership between 1983, when data on union membership was
first collected by the BLS, to 2005). Notably, the data for 2008 reflected a slight increase,
which has prompted some observers to suggest that the decline in union membership has
"bottomed out" and that growth is likely in the future. See Peter Whoriskey, American
POST,

Union Ranks GrowAfter 'Bottoming Out,"WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009, at A8.
216. 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(e), 662(d) (2006).
217. Both the OSH Act and its legislative history underscore the right of a
representative who is "authorized" by employees to accompany an OSHA inspector during
a worksite inspection. § 657(e); S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 11-12 (1970). The Senate Report
acknowledged that "questions may arise as to who shall be considered a duly authorized
representative of employees," but that "[t]he bill provides the Secretary of Labor with the
authority to promulgate regulations for resolving this question." S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 11
(1970). Similarly, in the Conference Report, it appears that "authorized representative"
was equated with collective bargaining representative. In settling upon the language of §
657, House members emphasized that the "provision in itself does not confer authority on
the Secretary to prescribe regulations with respect to representation questions in a
collective bargaining context."
H. R. REP. No. 91-1765 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5228, 5234.
This interpretation is supported by other occupational safety and health-related
regulations, which specifically define the term "authorized employee representative."
Under the rules of procedure of OSHRC, "authorized employee representative" is defined
as a "labor organization that has a collective bargaining relationship with the ... employer
and that represents affected employees." 29 C.F.R. § 2200.1(g) (2007). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1904.35(b)(2)(i) (2007) (in the context of disclosure of injury and illness records, defining
"authorized employee representative" as "an authorized collective bargaining agent of
employees").
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defining characteristic of unions; in other words, vigilance over workplace
safety, along with more tangible items such as health care coverage or
pensions, are among the bundle of "benefits" that a union offers to
prospective members. Unions use OSHA standards and noncompliance as
a way to gain bargaining strength during organizing campaigns, and also
after a collective bargaining agreement is in place. Many collective
bargaining agreements call for the creation of joint committees on
occupational safety and health, through which union and management
representatives can raise and discuss relevant issues.2 18 In these ways,
unions have secured many important workplace safety and health
protections for their members.219
Given that unions have occupied this advocacy space, the following
question arises: Have unions been fully attentive to the workplace safety
and health needs of foreign-born workers? During parts of the twentieth
century, unions excluded certain classes of marginalized workers, including
African-Americans, and, more recently, have held mixed views regarding
immigrant workers.22 °
Moreover, unions historically supported
restrictionist immigration policies. In the early part of the twentieth
century, unions supported the expansion of the Chinese Exclusion Act and
the enactment of a literacy test to curtail immigration from Southern and
Eastern Europe.22 ' In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the AFL-CIO's
position on immigration gradually began to soften. This shift was
attributable to an increase in progressive voices in organized labor and to
the rise of the civil rights movement, which began to trickle into the labor
movement and silence some of the racist rhetoric.2 22
In the decades that followed, the views espoused by the affiliate
members of the AFL-CIO on immigrant workers and immigration
policy-particularly regarding undocumented immigrants-began to shift.
218. Some observers have criticized the effectiveness of these joint committees, which
are typically comprised of equal numbers of union and management representatives. These
committees often do not have a clear agenda or procedure for taking action on issues of
concern. PAGE & O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 117-19.
219. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosen, A Labor Perspective on Workplace Violence
Prevention,20 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 161,165-66 (2001) (describing several examples of
how unions have successfully lobbied for greater protections against workplace violence
across a range of industries).
220. See Molly McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions.-Identity Politicsin the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1346 nn.27-28 (1997) (noting the history of exclusion of
African-Americans and other minority groups by U.S. labor unions); Krissah Williams,
Unions Split on Immigrant Workers, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at D1 (describing mixed
views among union representatives as to the role of immigrant workers and prospects for
immigration reform).
221. LEAH A. HAUS, UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: NEW
CHALLENGES AND CHANGING COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 43-56
(2002).
222. Id.at 69.
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The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), which
represents workers in poultry, meatpacking, and other industries, did not
adopt an official position on immigration until the late 1990s, when it
joined a call by the AFL-CIO for a new amnesty program. 2 3 Since the late
1980s, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has taken an
active, pro-immigrant stance, driven by "organizing considerations in
conjunction with some skepticism about the government's ability to
completely control migration. 2 24 The United Farm Workers endorsed an
amnesty proposal in the 1980s and has called for a repeal of employer
sanctions laws.225
Some of the construction craft unions (commonly referred to as the
"Building and Construction Trades"), 226 however, continued to grasp onto
the legacy of restrictionist policies. In the mid-1980s, several of the
construction craft unions adopted resolutions blaming unauthorized
immigration for high unemployment levels and depressed wages. Around
the same time, after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act and its employer sanctions provisions, the construction craft unions
repeatedly urged the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to visit
worksites where undocumented immigrants reportedly worked. 227 By the
late 1990s, however, this restrictionist approach among the building and
construction trades began to give way to a renewed focus on organizing all
workers in a particular sector, regardless of their citizenship status.228
Over the last decade, as membership numbers have declined and the
population of immigrant workers has risen, unions have continued to
adopt more inclusive attitudes towards immigrant workers. Nevertheless,
many unions-particularly those in the building and construction tradesstruggle with organizing and outreach efforts among immigrants. The
culture in some of these unions can be slow to shift. The result is that
many of the immigrant workers who are most vulnerable to workplace
hazards are not unionized; moreover, they lack a meaningful voice in the
223. Id. at 77. Prior to its statement in the late 1990s, the UFCW declined to take a
strong position on immigration, despite having significant numbers of Latino members and
chairing the AFL-CIO Immigration Committee in the mid-1990s. Id
224. Id at 81-87.
225. Id.at 88-89.
226. The AFL-CIO has a designated "Building and Construction Trades Department."
See Building & Construction Trades Department, Home, http://www.bctd.org (last visited
Aug. 30, 2009).
227. HAUS, supra note 221, at 89-90.
228. Id. at 93. Despite this shift, some unions have continued to speak out against the
employment of undocumented workers. See, e.g., Alex Pappas & Jeff Amy, Union Renews
Protests over ThyssenKrupp ContractorHiring,PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), June 24,
2009, at B5 (reporting protests by the Mobile-Pensacola Building and Construction Trades
Council at the alleged hiring of undocumented workers by the subsidiary of German
multinational, ThyssenKrupp Steel USA), available at http://www.al.com/news/pressregister/metro.ssf?/base/news/124583493975240.xml&coll=3.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

2009]

A NEW VISIONFOR WORKPLACE REGULATION

521

regulatory regime.2 9 One might argue that unions' efforts to strengthen
workplace safety protections will improve conditions at all workplaces,
regardless of whether or not immigrants are unionized. Unfortunately,
this position ignores OSHA's structural and resource limitations, such as
the use of selective enforcement, which may leave nonunionized and
largely immigrant workplaces with less protection despite union victories.
The historical role of unions and the lack of a meaningful advocacy
role for nonunion worker organizations (and other entities) is a significant
and overarching limitation of the current regulatory structure. This is not
to suggest that foreign-born workers who are unionized are necessarily
free from workplace safety risks. The overall decline in union bargaining
strength has weakened the pro-worker voice in the regulatory process,
leading to gaps in standards and enforcement efforts.230 Moreover, as
described below, other features of OSHA's structure beleaguer its ability
to protect immigrant workers, regardless of whether they are represented
by a union.
B. Rulemaking: Delays and Coverage Gaps
OSHA's standards have faced criticism from all sides, including
employers, who have deemed some of the standards to be irrelevant.23 1
Two other criticisms that have been leveled against OSHA standards are
that they focus too much on safety hazards, as opposed to health, and that
OSHA has emphasized the use of "engineering controls," as opposed to
personal protective equipment, to reduce health risks.23 2 For foreign-born
workers, however, certain features of the standard-setting process, and of
the landscape of existing standards, pose particular challenges.
1. Delays in StandardSetting and Implementation
One limitation that has affected all workers, including immigrant
229. One might argue that community-based organizations serving immigrants,
including members of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, can occupy this role.
Although many nonprofit organizations focus on the rights of immigrant workers, relatively
few devote attention to occupational safety and health matters. As described in Section IV,
infra, a more prominent role for such organizations on workplace safety and health matters
will inure to the benefit of immigrant workers.
230. In offering this critique of the role of unions, I do not mean to suggest that
unions' efforts to organize immigrants are futile or that unions will never be adequate
representatives for the workplace safety concerns for foreign-born workers. Rather, my
position is that, in the current historical and political moment, unions alone cannot address
the occupational safety and health concerns of immigrants. A strengthened labor
movement in the future will certainly benefit all workers, including foreign-born workers.
231. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 3.
232. Id. at 36.
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workers, is the very protracted pace of OSHA's regulatory efforts. The
rulemaking process is slow and unresponsive to a dynamic economy and
fluid labor market. A report released in 2000 by the National Advisory
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health noted that the
development and promulgation of OSHA standards takes an average of
ten years.233 External observers have confirmed the lengthy delays in
promulgating both safety- and health-related standards.3
One example is a regulation relating to employer payment for
personal protective equipment (PPE).235 Under the proposed standard,
first published in 1999, employers are to assume the cost for equipment
needed to protect individual workers from safety and health risks. Lowwage workers in the informal economy are in great need of protective
equipment, such as safety goggles, helmets, and gloves, to protect them
from safety hazards.236 Given the increased numbers of injuries to the
head and neck, particularly among Latino workers,237 the need for a
standard related to PPE was likely apparent to OSHA regulators. But,
because of the delays in OSHA's rulemaking process, a final rule was not
adopted until late 2007, nearly nine years after the initiation of rulemaking
process.23 s
As noted above, once standards are promulgated, employers or others'
may further delay their implementation by challenging whether there is
"substantial evidence" to support the standard.239 The OSH Act allows
any individual who is adversely affected by a standard to file a petition
with a federal circuit court within sixty days of promulgation of the
standard.24 ° Challenges may also be brought if OSHA fails to provide a
statement of reasons supporting the standard, if the standard is
unconstitutionally vague, or if there were procedural defects in the
233. NAT'L ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, OSHA's STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (2000), available at http://
www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nreport.html.
234. See, e.g., MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 185-86; Sidney A. Shapiro,
Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
13-14 (1989).
235. See Employer Payment for Personal Protective Equipment, 64 Fed. Reg. 15,402
(proposed Mar. 31, 1999). According to this initial notice in the Federal Register, the
comment period was to close in July 1999. Id. at 15,431.
236. See IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 3 (noting high injury and
fatality rates among the foreign-born workforce).
237. See supra Section I.
238. See Employer Payment for Personal Protective Equipment, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,34164,430 (Nov. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, 1926). The
standard became effective on February 13, 2008. Id.
239. See WALTER B. CONNOLLY JR. & DONALD R. CROWELL 1I, A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT § 15.02 (American Lawyer Media,
2009); supra note 135 and accompanying text.
240. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2006); CONNOLLY & CROWELL, supra note 239, at § 15.02.
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rulemaking process.4

While these delays in standard setting and implementation affect all
who are employed in a particular industry, the effects are exacerbated for
immigrant workers. As OSHA itself acknowledged when it issued the
final rule relating to employer payment for PPE, a large percentage of the
nation's workers-including many immigrant workers-are not unionized,
and therefore cannot rely on collective bargaining as a vehicle to obtain
safety protections.24 2 Moreover, as noted above, OSHA lacks a system for
establishing priorities in its standard-setting process.
Consequently,
standards are likely to advance only when political or interest group
demands are brought to bear. Although many unions are cognizant of the
data trends involving foreign-born workers, additional voices of immigrant
worker advocates are needed in the standard-setting process. Finally,
given the growing proportion of workplace fatalities and injuries among
foreign-born workers (as compared with native-born workers) in several
industries, 243 delays in standard setting related to these industries will
necessarily have a disproportionate effect on the immigrant workforce.
2. Examples of Gaps in Regulations
As described above, the BLS has documented increases in fatalities
among foreign-born workers in certain industries and workplace
circumstances. Despite troubling statistics relating to the risks that
immigrants face on the job, gaps in regulations continue to exist.
Workplace health and safety advocates, including unions, continue to
advocate for stronger standards for all workers. These advocates have
articulated concern about increased fatalities among Latino immigrant
workers. 2' Nevertheless, greater emphasis could be placed on standards
that respond to data trends and that correct deficiencies having a direct
effect on immigrant workers. Broadly, these deficiencies stem from: the
exclusion of certain types of workers, by regulation, from the protection of
the OSH Act; the absence of standards for certain occupations and
industries; and agency interpretations that weaken existing standards. An
example of each is provided below.
a) Exclusion by Regulation: Domestic Workers
The OSH Act, by regulation, does not protect individuals employed to
241.
242.
64,344.
243.
244.

CONNOLLY & CROWELL, supra note 239, at § 15.02.

See Employer Payment for Personal Protective Equipment, 72 Fed. Reg. at
See supra Section I.
2008 Seminario Statement, supranote 200, at 1.
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perform "ordinary domestic household tasks, such as house cleaning,
cooking, and caring for children., 241 Immigrant women of color appear to
constitute a significant portion of this workforce, although accurate
nationwide statistics are not available, given the prevalence of informal
employment arrangements.24 6 The few formal studies of domestic workers
that have been conducted in metropolitan centers confirm the
predominance of immigrant women.247
These reports on domestic workers also reflect significant concerns
relating to workplace health and safety. A recent study of household
domestic workers in California revealed that 75% of the workers had not
received any protective gear, such as masks or gloves, and that 86% had
not received training on job safety or injury prevention. 248 Heavy lifting,
use of toxic chemicals, and cleaning in difficult-to-reach places are
commonly required of domestic workers and render them susceptible to
work-related injuries and illnesses.24 9
As the domestic work industry continues to thrive, OSHA's
engagement with this workforce is warranted. While a repeal of the
domestic worker exception may be an ultimate goal, OSHA can begin by
collecting and reviewing data, perhaps in collaboration with NIOSH, and
by developing non-binding guidelines to protect domestic employees from
common workplace risks.
b) Absent Standards: Workplace Violence
One industry that has received relatively little attention in the OSHA
standard-setting process is the retail industry, which has experienced high

245. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2007).
246. See Mary Romero, Nanny Diaries and Other Stories.- Imagining Immigrant
Women's Labor in the Social Reproduction of American Families,52 DEPAUL L. REV. 809,

814 (2003).
247. See DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATACENTER, supra note 124, at 2
(reporting that 99% of domestic workers in New York City are foreign-born); GREGORY
GAINES, JORDAN HEAD, MATTHEW MOKEY, AMY POTEMSKI, MICHAEL STEPANSKY & AMY
VANCE,

WORKING

CONDITIONS OF DOMESTIC WORKERS IN MONTGOMERY

COUNTY,

21 (2006) (presenting the findings of a survey of nearly 300 domestic workers
in a suburban county outside of Washington, D.C., which found that domestic workers in
the county are primarily immigrants), available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/
MARYLAND

content/council/pdfJREPORTS/domestic-workers.pdf;

MUJERES UNIDAS Y ACTIVAS, DAY
LABOR PROGRAM WOMEN'S COLLECTIVE OF LA RAZA CENTRO LEGAL & DATACENTER,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: WORKING CONDITIONS OF CALIFORNIA'S DOMESTIC WORKERS 3

(2007) [hereinafter BEHIND CLOSED DOORS] (reporting that 99% of survey respondents
were born outside the U.S.), available at http://www.datacenter.org/reports/
behindcloseddoors.pdf.
248. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 247, at 6.
249. Id; DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATACENTER, supra note 124, at 23.
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rates of workplace fatalities due to violence. 250 The BLS's statistics
establish that the retail industry accounted for 26.7% of all workplace
homicides in 2006.251 In addition to these fatalities, data suggest that
millions of nonfatal assaults occur each year in the retail workplace. z2
Workers in the retail sales industry experience a greater total number of
"violent victimizations" in the workplace than even law enforcement
officers.253
OSHA has been on notice regarding the prevalence of workplace
homicides since at least 1993, when NIOSH issued an alert encouraging
employers to take a number of steps to reduce the risk of violence.5 4
OSHA has adopted "voluntary guidelines" for several industries that
experience high rates of workplace violence.2 ' To date, however, OSHA
has not promulgated a formal standard related to workplace violence.
Although the guidelines do exist, studies have demonstrated the
limitations of a "voluntary compliance" approach.25 6 OSHA regulations in
this area would put employers directly on notice as to the steps they must
take to provide a more safe and secure workplace. Although the root
causes of workplace violence are complex, such standards would only aid

250. See supra Section I.
251. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Nat'l Census
of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2006, at 4, 7 (Aug. 9, 2007) (noting that there were 138
homicides in the retail trade industry out of a total of 516 homicides in 2006), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cfoi_08092007.pdf.
252. See Rosen, supra note 219, at 162 (citing a National Crime Victimization Survey,
which found that, from 1992 to 1996, approximately two million nonfatal assaults occurred
each year in the workplace).
253. Id. at 162. Although police officers and corrections officers suffer the highest
rates of nonfatal workplace violence, the next highest rate of violence was experienced by
taxi drivers. Id. at 163. Gas station employees and convenience/liquor store workers
experienced high rates of violence as well (79.1 and 68.4 victims per 1000 workers,
respectively). Id.
254. Press Release, Nat'l Inst. of Occupational Safety & Health, Update: NIOSH
Urges Immediate Action to Prevent Workplace Homicide (Oct. 25, 1993), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/updates/94-101.html.
While the alert does not specifically
mention foreign-born workers, it notes that between 1980 and 1989, occupational homicide
rates "for both blacks and other races.., were more than twice the rate for white workers."
-d. The alert flagged taxicab establishments, liquor stores, and gas stations as the most
dangerous workplaces at that time. Id.
255. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. OSHA has issued
voluntary guidelines for the following industries: taxi and livery drivers, late-night retail
establishments, health care and social service workers, and community workers. Id. at 13
n.5. Some of the recommended measures include improving visibility and lighting and
installing
physical
barriers,
surveillance
equipment,
and
panic
buttons.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION,

supra note 67.

The

guidelines for health care and social service workers were modeled on similar efforts
undertaken by California's OSHA and the Department of Labor and Industries of
Washington State. Rosen, supra note 219, at 164.
256. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 219, at 164 (noting that research shows "few
employers are implementing full [workplace violence] programs").
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efforts to decrease fatalities and injuries among immigrant workers in
these vulnerable retail occupations.
c) Weakened Standards:FallProtection in Construction
Each year, the greatest number of workplace fatalities occurs in the
construction industry.257
Foreign-born workers, especially Latino
immigrant workers, are disproportionately represented in the construction
trades relative to their overall presence in the workforce. 5 8 Among all
foreign-born worker fatalities in the United States, each year the most
occur in the construction industry.259
Recent reports have demonstrated that a significant number of
immigrant worker fatalities occur as a result of "falls," in the context of
building erection and roofing work.260 Despite this growing concern,
OSHA has issued an interpretation weakening worker protections in this
area. Specifically, in 2002, OSHA issued a compliance directive that
allows contractors to forgo the installation of protective "netting" or
"decking" when workers are required to use a safety harness. 261 The
decking provides a second layer of protection in the event that a harness
257. BLS Press Release, 2007 Fatalities, supra note 1, at 2.
258. NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LATINOS IN CONSTRUCTION: BREAKING BARRIERS,

BUILDING HOPE 4-5 (2005) (citing data demonstrating the overrepresentation of Latino
immigrant workers in the U.S. construction industry and particular construction
occupations),
available at http://www.nclr.org/files/34838 fileLatinosConstruction_
FNL.pdf.
259. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Foreign-Born
Workers and On-the-Job Fatalities by Industry, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/20O4/jun/wk5/
art03.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (showing that 24% of fatalities among foreign-born
workers in 2004 occurred in the construction industry).
260. Loh & Richardson, supra note 33, at 48-49 (noting that "falls to a lower level"
were the second most frequent cause of workplace fatalities among foreign-born workers
from 1996 to 2001). See also IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supra note 19, at 3 (noting
that falls account for approximately 15% of workplace fatalities among foreign-born
workers).
261. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. CPL
02-01-234: Inspection Policy and Procedures for OSHA's Steel Erection Standards for
Construction (Mar. 22, 2002) (advising OSHA inspectors that if "an employer establishes,
communicates and enforces a requirement to be protected by fall arrest equipment at all
times above 15 feet (or less), the failure to comply with [29 C.F.R.] § 1926.754(b)(3) [which
requires decking or netting within thirty feet below any steel erection work] is considered a
de minimis violation and will not be cited"), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show document?pjtable=DIRECTIVES&p id=2730; Alexandra Berzon, Union
Demands Safety Upgrade, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 9, 2008, at 1, available at http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/apr/O9/union-demands-safety-upgrade.
As this article was going to press, OSHA announced a rescission of the March 2002
directive. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. CPL
02-01-046: Rescission of OSHA's De Minimis Policies Relating to Floors/Nets and Shear
Connectors (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive-pdf/
CPL_02-01-046.pdf.
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fails to operate properly. Recent incidents in Las Vegas reveal that at least
nine workers died from workplace falls during a sixteen-month period
between 2007 and 2008;262 a number of those lives might have been saved
had OSHA insisted on both levels of protection. 26 3 Although OSHA
recently rescinded the 2002 directive, this lax interpretation of standards
ignored documented trends of fatalities and injuries among immigrants.
C. Inspections and Training
The existing standards and procedures for worksite inspections
systematically disadvantage foreign-born workers. The current "triggers"
for worksite inspections are not likely to be initiated by immigrant workers
or their advocates; in this regard, the presence (or absence) of a union
figures prominently. The criteria used by OSHA for "random" inspections
are likewise prone to exclude large numbers of immigrant workers.
Moreover, the inspection process itself is not accessible to many immigrant
workers due to language barriers and other factors.
1. "Triggers"for Inspections Exclude Immigrant Workers
When OSHA conducts an unprogrammed inspection of a worksite, it
typically initiates the inspection based on a workplace complaint or a
record of workplace health and safety violations.2 ' However, foreign-born
workers may be inhibited from filing a complaint due to multiple factors,
including limited English proficiency, lack of familiarity with their rights or
the legal process, fear of jeopardizing their immigration status, the need
for job security, lack of knowledge about government agencies, and
more. 265 Consequently, OSHA may not know to flag an employer that
relies heavily on immigrant workers and fails to report workplace injuries
(or discourages its employees from doing so).
In this context as well, unions play a pivotal role in the effectiveness of
the regulatory regime. Where a workplace is organized, a union can
request and obtain an OSHA inspection with relative ease. 266 The union
can then designate a representative to participate in the inspection and
monitor compliance with any citations issued by OSHA's Compliance

262. Berzon, supra note 261.

263. Note that although Nevada is an OSHA state-plan state, the state agency has
adopted, by reference, federal OSHA standards relating to construction. See Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Nevada State Plan Information,
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/stateprogs/nevada.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
264. See OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
at 5, 7.
265. See id.
266. See MENDELOFF, supranote 79, at 91.
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Safety and Health Officers.2 67 Absent a union, there are few entities with
the leverage to challenge the employer on its workplace safety record.268
Statistically speaking, OSHA inspections are a relatively rare
occurrence, absent a complaint or a serious accident.2 69 Even when
inspections do occur, an employer can refuse entrance to an inspector
unless the inspector has an administrative warrant issued pursuant to a
"neutral" selection process.270 Moreover, unless there is an obviously
dangerous situation at the workplace, the employer can delay the
inspection for a few days by objecting to the warrant.27 1
As noted above, OSHA's SST Program, which generates an inspection
plan for non-construction worksites, includes only those worksites that
have forty or more employees.27 2 This approach leaves out many foreignborn workers due to their concentration in smaller workplaces.273
Similarly, for the construction industry, where fatality and injury rates are
the highest, OSHA relies upon data from the F.W. Dodge Report 274 to
267. Id
268. See id. ("Most OSHA officials with whom I have spoken agree that the vast
majority of requests for inspections are filed from unionized workplaces.").
269. For example, in 2006, a total of 96,956 inspections were conducted by federal or
state occupational safety and health officials. See Is OSHA Working for Working People?"
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Employment and Worker Safety of the S. Comm. on
Health,Education,Labor,andPensions, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of Peg Seminario,

Director of Safety and Health, AFL-CIO). Assuming each inspection was conducted at a
different worksite, these inspections cover only 1.1% of the 8.5 million worksites covered
by OSHA. Id. Moreover, as noted in Section II.B.2, supra, in recent years OSHA has
shifted towards a voluntary compliance scheme whereby a significant part of OSHA's
compliance work is done with businesses that have voluntarily agreed to participate in
OSHA's programs of yearly worksite check-ins, exemptions from routine inspections, free
consultations, and other incentives. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 167, at
5, 8. Businesses that have not agreed to voluntary compliance are generally only
investigated when employees lodge a complaint or a serious accident occurs, although
OSHA also partly bases its inspection plan on data regarding injury and illnesses in
particular industries or worksites. See id.
270. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-25 (1978) (holding that the OSH
Act could not constitutionally permit the Secretary of Labor to authorize warrantless
worksite inspections).
271. See 2 Guide to Employment Law and Regulations § 18:31 (West 2009). But see
THOMAS

D.

SCHNEID & MICHAEL S. SCHUMANN, LEGAL LIABILITY:

A

GUIDE FOR SAFETY

62 (1997) (although employers can challenge an
inspection warrant, frivolous challenges may subject them to contempt citations).
272. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No.
09-05 (CPL 02): Site-Specific Targeting 2009, at 6 (July 20, 2009), available at http://
www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive-pdf/CPL 02 09-05.pdf.
273. See NESS, supra note 86, at 22-23, 25 (noting that immigrant workers tend to be
concentrated in less-regulated workplaces).
274. The F.W. Dodge Report is a listing of construction projects nationwide that are
available for public bidding. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
The report is compiled by McGraw Hill Construction Information and is available online at
a password protected site.
See Find a Project Now (Dodge Reports), http://
www.fwdodge.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
AND Loss PREVENTION PROFESSIONALS
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develop a list of target inspection sites.2 5 This report does not contain
comprehensive information about smaller construction sites, where
immigrant workers are often employed.2 76 OSHA's Special Emphasis
Programs may capture additional worksites, but their overall effectiveness
has not been studied.
OSHA may also be reluctant to target smaller employers due to the
costs potentially imposed on those businesses. Some small and mediumsized companies have expressed concern that the cost of compliance with
OSHA regulations will require layoffs of employees or other cutbacks that
ultimately harm workers. 77 Some continue to argue, following a purely
economic analysis, that workplace accidents and illnesses should be
prevented only "up to the point at which it becomes more expensive to
prevent them than to allow them to occur. 2 7 8 It is impossible, of course, to
avoid moral judgments about the "cost" of saving one life over another or
the "cost" of a life versus the economic cost of compliance.2 79
2. Barriersto Immigrant Workers During the Inspection Process
Even when OSHA does inspect a workplace with foreign-born
280
workers, it faces significant problems during the inspection process itself.
Linguistic barriers often arise between inspectors and employees who do
not speak English. The Office of the Inspector General of the Department
of Labor noted that OSHA's inspectorate had difficulty communicating
with workers who speak languages other than English and that interpreters
hired from outside OSHA who are not familiar with technical terms may
Inspectors themselves have
have trouble facilitating investigations.28 '

275. OIG

IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT,

supra note 3, at 12. See also Occupational

Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. CPL 02-00-141: Inspection
Scheduling for Construction (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Inspection Scheduling for
Construction], available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?
p_table=DIRECTIVES&pid=3409E.
276. OIG

IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT,

supra note 3, at 12. See also Inspection

Scheduling for Construction, supra note 275 (describing an OSHA study that found that the
Dodge Report covers 90% of construction projects over $50,000).
277. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 67-68 (describing an employer who
threatened that abatement of an OSHA-cited hazard would lead to a reduction in his
workforce).
278. MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 7.
279. See id.at 6.
280. Apart from the challenges unique to immigrant workers, inspectors simply may
not detect violations of standards, given the thousands of standards with which they must
become familiar. See MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 88. See generally LOFGREN, supra
note 100 (describing the wide range of industries and standards that an OSHA inspector
must be able to navigate).
281. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. The linguistic barriers

in the inspection process are not cured simply by hiring bilingual personnel or recruiting
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reported challenges involved in speaking with limited English proficient
employees.282 Moreover, the use of a telephonic interpretation service,
which OSHA has recommended in its Field Operations Manual, would
make obtaining written statements extremely cumbersome, and generally
seems a suboptimal way to build confidence in the agency and its
personnel.283

Even when OSHA inspectors and foreign-born employees share a
language, developing trust can be a challenge. Although inspectors may
interview employees in private, immigrant workers may fear retaliation for
speaking candidly about workplace concerns. Workers might also be
concerned, especially in smaller workplaces, that a complainant could be
easily identified, even if the complaints are submitted anonymously and
the worker is interviewed in private.
Moreover, immigrant workers, especially those with a tenuous
immigration status, are unlikely to welcome a conversation with a federal
government employee.2 "4 This has been an even greater challenge in
recent years as the government has heightened its immigration
enforcement efforts. 85 To complicate matters further, federal immigration
enforcement officers have used the ruse of a "mandatory" workplace
safety meeting to conduct a worksite raid."s6
3. A Shift Towards Voluntary Compliance

As discussed in Section II.B.2, supra, in recent years OSHA has opted
for even fewer inspections and has emphasized more collaborative, semivoluntary compliance programs, including the VPP. In order to be
successful, these programs require employers to take the initiative in
revealing both their successes and challenges with workplace safety and be
willing to partner with the federal government. To its credit, as of
interpreters. The individuals communicating with immigrant workers must be familiar with
OSHA regulations and terminology and must be able to translate technical terms between
languages.
282. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 94 (describing how the author
communicated with employees during an inspection by presenting workers with a card
written in Spanish).
283. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 3-24.
284. IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK, supranote 19, at 10.
285. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Fact
Sheet, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009)
(reporting more than a tenfold increase in worksite enforcement arrests over the course of
six years, from 510 in 2002 to 6287 in 2008).
286. Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., North Carolina Work Site Enforcement Action Puts
Workers at Risk, 19 IMMIGRANTS' RTS. UPDATE 5 (2005) ("On July 6, 2005, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents arrested and detained immigrant
workers from the Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, North Carolina, by
posing as staff members of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).").
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287
February 2009, OSHA had registered over 2200 employers in the VPP.
Unfortunately, this represents only a tiny fraction of the millions of
employers in the United States. 88
Moreover, it is logical that employers who participate in the VPP
generally are larger entities in more established industries who already
have some safety and health plans in place. Although OSHA's list of VPP
participants does not specify the relative size of the workplaces, a
significant number are well known, established companies that operate
regionally or nationally."8 9
Although SHARP focuses on smaller
workplaces, it, like the VPP, requires considerable transparency on the
part of the employer. The most vulnerable workers, who labor in the
informal or underground economy, are effectively overlooked by this
regulatory approach.
Furthermore, cooperative programs presuppose a longer-term
relationship between the employer and OSHA in which the two entities
work together to move towards full compliance in the long run. By their
very nature, however, construction projects, where many immigrant
workers are employed, are short lived; each project has a distinct physical
layout and, therefore, requires its own diagnosis.2 9 In response to this
concern, OSHA recently moved to expand the VPP to include mobile
workforces. 291 It remains to be seen whether the VPP will contribute to a
reduction in fatalities or injuries among immigrant construction workers,
or even among construction workers in general.2"

287. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Voluntary
Protection Programs, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/sitebystate.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2009).
288. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics About Business Size from the Census
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html

(last

visited Aug. 30, 2009)

(reporting the existence of more than seven million employers in the United States as of
2002).
289. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA
Voluntary Protection Program, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/sitebysic.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2009).
290. See Morantz, supra note 194, at 186 n.5.
291. See Revisions to the Voluntary Protection Programs to Provide Safe and
Healthful Working Conditions, 74 Fed. Reg. 927-952 (Jan. 9, 2009) (describing an
expansion of the VPP to allow participation by mobile workforces, which predominate in
the construction industry).
292. A recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office found significant
deficiencies with the VPP, including poor oversight and an absence of performance
measures. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OSHA's VOLUNTARY PROTECTION
PROGRAMS: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAM

QUALITY (2009), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09395.pdf.
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4. Limitations of OSHA's TrainingEfforts
In order to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries among foreignborn workers, the workers must receive appropriate training on workplace
hazards and the use of personal protective equipment. Most existing
OSHA standards do not explicitly require employers to tailor their
training programs to the language abilities and literacy levels of their
employees.2 93 Given the growing diversity of the U.S. workforce and the
increased mobility of human capital in the globalized economy, OSHA and
employers must address issues of language and literacy. Similarly,
trainings offered in foreign languages may not always address the cultural
barriers that affect worker receptivity to, and comprehension of, training
materials. To its credit, OSHA has made efforts to offer training courses
in Spanish and to cultivate trainers with Spanish language ability."'
Worker access to training is another concern. Although OSHA has
sought to make its trainings available in different locales, immigrant
workers may simply be unaware of the existence of trainings, especially if
they do not work for established employers or are not represented by
unions. While OSHA's Alliance Program helps to deliver trainings
directly to some foreign-born workers,2 95 many more outlets for education
and training could be pursued.2 96
D. State Plans: Unpredictability
OSHA's relationship with the occupational safety and health
departments of individual states is another element of its regulatory
framework that has a profound impact on worksite conditions. As
described above, the OSH Act empowers states to assume primary
enforcement authority for occupational safety and health matters. The
limitation of the state-plan approach, however, is that it requires OSHA to
police the enforcement efforts of the states. 297 Lapses in OSHA oversight,
293. See OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that
OSHA's standards for training employees in workplace safety, with one exception, do not
require employer consideration of their employees' literacy and language, but stating that
OSHA claims it interprets these provisions "to mean providing training in a manner that
employees understand").
294. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA FACT
SHEET: HISPANIC OUTREACH (2007) [hereinafter OSHA HISPANIC OUTREACH], available at
http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data-Hispanic/hispanic-outreach.pdf.
295. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Alliance
Program: Regional Success Stories: Region III, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/successstories/
alliances/regional/reg3_successstories.html#Delmarva (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
296. See infra Section IV.B.2 (recommending greater collaboration in OSHA's
training and education efforts).
297. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 174-75 (noting that the OSH Act
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when coupled with regulatory failures on the state level, can lead to
disastrous consequences. 29 8 The likely result is that vulnerable workers are
subject to the vicissitudes of state political processes. State and local
politics influencing safety and health regulation are often even more
beholden to powerful local economic interests, and state agencies are
therefore even less willing to regulate certain sectors of the economy for
fear of driving commerce away from the state. 299 Although several authors
have warned of the proverbial "race to the bottom" as states endeavor to
attract business,3" this fear has little, if any, empirical basis." 1
Nevertheless, the role of states must be considered carefully by federal
OSHA regulators, particularly given the restrictive, ostensibly antiimmigrant policies that some local and state government officials have
adopted. 0 2 As some jurisdictions move to limit services and benefits for
immigrants-particularly those who are undocumented-it is not
unrealistic to fear that regulatory resources might similarly be withheld
when immigrant workers are involved.

requires OSHA to ensure that state programs provide at least the level of protection that
the federal government would give, and describing a GAO report and a Department of
Labor audit that found deficiencies in OSHA's oversight of state plans).
298. See id. (describing an incident in North Carolina in which twenty-five workers
were burned to death in a plant that had not been inspected in eleven years and had
inadequate fire protections, after OSHA had deemed the state's monitoring program
"effective" in spite of its small number of inspectors). More recently, OSHA announced
the formation of a task force to investigate the performance of Nevada's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration following a rash of construction fatalities in the Las
Vegas area. Alexandra Berzon, Rare Study by Feds May Prompt OSHA Changes, LAS
VEGAS SUN, July 31, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jul/31/
rare-study-feds-may-prompt-osha-changes.
299. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 100, at 27 (describing the politicization of OSHA
enforcement efforts in California and how a new administration was expected to bring a
new, "more relaxed," approach to OSHA enforcement); Morantz, supra note 194, at 186
("[I]f officials in state-plan states are especially beholden to local business interests, they
might seize upon the Consultation Program as a convenient form of 'window dressing' that
helps satisfy [the devolution provision of] the OSH Act without antagonizing local firms.").
300. See, e.g., Bradbury, supra note 117, at 212.
301. Cf Morantz, supra note 194, at 183 (finding that although "state inspectors use
traditional enforcement tools more sparingly than their federal counterparts, typically citing
fewer violations and collecting lower fines per violation," and federal enforcement seems to
lower the frequency of nonfatal injuries to construction workers, state programs also see
fewer fatal worksite injuries, making the overall effectiveness of state plans relative to
federal enforcement ambiguous).
302. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-325.03 (2009), 63.2-503.1 (2007) (denying public
benefits to undocumented immigrants, except when required by federal law); AUDREY
SINGER, JILL H. WILSON

&

BROOKE DERENZIS, IMMIGRANTS, POLITICS, AND LOCAL

RESPONSE IN SUBURBAN WASHINGTON 3 (2009) (describing laws passed in Hazleton, Pa.,

and Farmer's Branch, Tex., that are unwelcoming to immigrants), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2009/0225-immigration-singer/0225-im
migration-singer.pdf.
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E. Insufficient Penaltiesand Infrequent Prosecutions
Although enforcement and deterrence are major components of
OSHA's mandate, the agency has faced criticism for its limited civil
penalties, its frequent reductions of penalty amounts, and its rare
prosecutions. 3 OSHA is authorized to impose penalties of up to $7000
for serious violations and $70,000 for willful violations, but the actual
penalties imposed rarely reach these ceilings. In workplace fatality
investigations conducted in 2007, the median initial penalty assessed by
OSHA was $5900; after negotiations and review-which are encouraged
by existing OSHA guidelines-the final penalty dropped to a median of
$3675." o Where the fatality was deemed to be the result of a willful
violation, the median final penalty rose only to only $29,400, less than half
of the maximum penalty authorized under the statute.3 5 During the same
year, the average penalty for all serious violations (including non-fatality
cases) was a mere $906, an amount unlikely to have any deterrent effect. °6
These fines stand in stark contrast to other federal statutes, which impose
equivalent
or higher fines for conduct that does not jeopardize human
30 7
life.
The imposition of these modest penalties is accompanied by a
reluctance to prosecute employers who violate the OSH Act. A 1988
congressional report on occupational safety determined that "a company
official who willfully and recklessly violates federal OSHA laws stands 30a8
greater chance of winning a state lottery than being criminally charged.,
Of all of the workplace fatality cases that were deemed eligible for
303. See, e.g., David Barstow, U.S.Rarely Seeks Charges for Deaths in Workplace,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at Al (revealing that even among the 1242 cases from 1982 to
2002 in which OSHA determined that workplace deaths resulted from employers' "willful"
violations of safety regulations, OSHA sought prosecution in only 7% of the cases, and
contrasting OSHA's low fines to the much stiffer civil penalties imposed for companies that
mislead investors). The relevant legislative history suggests that the Department of Labor
lacked the political will to impose and enforce fines even before the OSH Act had passed
through Congress. Then Secretary of Labor George Shultz noted that, given the "tight
labor markets," "to become known as an employer with unsafe practices is to have the
reputation of operating an undesirable place to work. And this in many ways is the most
severe penalty that is involved." MENDELOFF, supra note 79, at 23 (citing Occupational
Safety: HearingBefore the S.Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 88 (1970)

(statement of George Shultz, Secretary of Labor)).
304.
OSHA's

U.S. SENATE, HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., DISCOUNTING DEATH:
FAILURE TO PUNISH SAFETY VIOLATIONS THAT KILL WORKERS 5 (2008)
[hereinafter DISCOUNTING DEATH], available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/

memorial/upload/worker safety-final.pdf.
305. Id.
306. 2008 Seminario Statement, supra note 200, at 3.

307. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (2006) (allowing for a maximum fine of $50,000
for knowingly violating the Endangered Species Act).
308. Barstow, supra note 303.
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prosecution between 1982 and 2002, 93% of those cases were not
prosecuted.0 9 Similarly, of the 237 willful violations eligible for referral
between 2003 and 2008, only fifty were referred for criminal prosecution;
of those fifty, only ten (4.2%) were actually prosecuted by the Department
of Justice.31 °
From the enactment of the OSH Act through 2007,
approximately 365,000 workers have died on the job in the United
States."' Yet, as of 2003, these fatalities had resulted in only sixteen prison
sentences for guilty employers.1 2 In recent years, only a handful of
additional employers have been sentenced to prison for OSHA-related
violations.3 13
Another enforcement challenge arises if an employer chooses to
appeal an OSHA citation to the OSHRC. This appeals process can last for
several years.3" 4 Don Lofgren describes the problems that flow from this
scenario:
With such long delays, a temporary job can be completed and a
contractor may have a new name and address long before action
can be taken. And, while the citation is under appeal, the
contractor is not liable for repeat citations, which carry higher
penalties.315
The problems cited by Lofgren are especially problematic for immigrant
workers, who are often employed by undercapitalized contractors and
subcontractors.316

309. Id,
310. DISCOUNTING

DEATH,

supra note 304, at 20.

311. AFL-CIO, Workplace Fatalities Since the Passage of OSHA, http://
www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/04.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
312. Barstow, supra note 303.
313. See John Marzulli, 2 Get 6 Mos. in Hardhat'sFatalPlunge, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
July 25, 2007, at 1 (reporting the sentencing of two construction company owners to six
months in prison, after a worker who lacked a safety harness fell to his death at a
construction site); Joe McDonald, 2nd P'burg Foundry Official Jailed for Cover-Up,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Apr. 22, 2009 (describing a case in which a human
resources manager was sentenced to forty-one months in prison for obstructing an OSHA
investigation).
314. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor,110th Cong. 6 (2008) (statement of Randy S. Rabinowitz), available
at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-04-23-RandyRabinowitz.pdf.
315. LOFGREN, supranote 100, at 34.
316. See, e.g., Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Norton, II & Catherine K.
Ruckelshaus, Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modem American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1999)
(describing the pervasive use of subcontractors in the garment industry, in which immigrant
workers are heavily represented).
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IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS: A NEW VISION FOR WORKPLACE REGULATION

A complex and interrelated set of factors has placed foreign-born
workers in a vulnerable position vis-A-vis workplace safety and health and
left them marginalized in the regulatory regime. To its credit, however,
OSHA has taken some steps to address the rise in workplace fatalities and
injuries among foreign-born workers. In October 2001, OSHA formed a
special task force to examine the issue of rising fatalities among Latino
workers.3"'
The agency has also cultivated some relationships with
community-based organizations that work closely with the Latino
community.318 In addition, OSHA created a Hispanic/ESL coordinator
position in each of its ten regions.3 19 These coordinators work with
individuals, businesses, and other institutions in the community to
coordinate education and outreach to Spanish-speaking workers.
While the measures taken by OSHA are laudable, more fundamental
and aggressive steps must be taken to bring the occupational safety
concerns of immigrant laborers to the forefront of the regulatory agenda.
Indeed, the data from the BLS and other organizations demonstrate that
immigrant workers continue to suffer a disproportionate number of
workplace fatalities and experience a significant number of work-related
injuries and illnesses.32 °
In presenting recommendations for reforms at OSHA, I offer not
simply a list of discrete policy proposals, but rather a new normative vision
for regulating safety in the workplace given the changing demographics of
the workforce.
The trend documented in this article calls for an
examination of theories of regulation in light of an agency's failure vis-Avis a particular, historically disadvantaged constituency.
I propose three regulatory imperatives to guide OSHA and other
similarly situated agencies: (1) transparency, (2) collaborative regulation,
and (3) antisubordination. A set of comprehensive reforms guided by
these imperatives will serve three important purposes: (1) to remedy some
317. OSHA Programs to Help Hispanic Workers, supra note 34.
318. See generally OSHA HISPANIC OUTREACH, supra note 294; Weekend Edition
Sunday.- Latinos'JobFatalityRate Highest of All Workers (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 2,

2008) ("Welsh says Cal-OSHA and other OSHA agencies across the country have been
reaching out to Latino labor and community organizations over the past decade. The
groups can then act as intermediaries, encouraging Latino workers to report dangerous

work conditions, so OSHA knows where to investigate."), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=87837162.

319. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Regional
Hispanic/ESL Coordinators, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance assistance/spanishl
hispanic_coordinators.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (listing the regional Hispanic/ESL

Coordinators).
320. See supra Section I.
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of the entrenched limitations of the regulatory regime related to
occupational safety and health; (2) to cultivate a stronger voice for
immigrant laborers in a regulatory process that, by its nature, will have a
political dimension; and (3) to counter the historical subordination of
immigrant laborers.
In the remainder of this section, I address the question of agency
resources, while acknowledging the importance of increased funding in
order for OSHA to realize its statutory mandate.321 I then outline the
regulatory imperatives that should guide OSHA's work, describing both
their theoretical underpinnings and their practical applications in the
present context.
A. The Question of Resources
Regulatory reforms, including some of those proposed below, often
involve significant costs that must be considered as part of the
appropriations process. This is particularly true for OSHA, an agency
which, according to many observers, has historically been underfunded.3 22
Notably, the amount budgeted for OSHA in 2008 was very similar to the
amount the agency received almost thirty years earlier in 1980. Moreover,
in 2008, the OSHA budget for enforcement activities was 12% lower than
the 1980 budget for enforcement activities.323 For fiscal year 2009,
however, the Obama administration has expanded the OSHA budget by
$27 million, for a total of $513 million.324
321. This section, and the article as a whole, presupposes the need for government
intervention on behalf of workers to adjust the balance of power in the employer-employee
relationship and to ensure adequate health and safety protections for workers. Certainly,
some critics of OSHA have called for the deregulationof labor markets on the premise that
unregulated markets can address health and safety concerns through embedded structural
features such as the payment of a "wage premium" to workers to compensate them for
workplace risks. See John D. Worrall, Compensation Costs, Injury Rates, and the Labor
Market, in SAFETY AND THE WORK FORCE: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES 1, 9 (John D.
Worrall ed., 1983).
This literature, however, fails to consider whether workers-particularly immigrant
workers-have exercised an autonomous choice between accepting a wage premium and
forcing an employer to reduce or eliminate workplace risks. The reality, of course, is that
most low-wage immigrant workers in the United States lack the power to make such a
choice. For economic migrants, who often face significant competition for employment and
who have only temporary lawful immigration status or are undocumented, meaningful
negotiation of the terms of employment is a rare occurrence. This is evidenced by the fact
that, from a statistical perspective, immigrant workers' hourly wages are lower on average
than those of native-born residents. URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND
WORKERS, A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE (2003).
322. See Workers Threatened by Decline in OSHA Budget, Enforcement Activity,

OMB WATCH, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3587.
323. Id.
324. Ames Alexander, OSHA Funding Up $27Million, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Mar.
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Increased funding, which can translate into additional human
resources, is needed to enhance all of the core functions of OSHA:
standard setting, inspections, enforcement, education, and training. While
funding is integral for agency effectiveness, additional resources alone will
not cure OSHA's shortcomings vis-A-vis the foreign-born workforce.
Rather, as presented in this article, the agency must adopt different
approaches in dealing with the workplace health and safety concerns of
immigrants.
B. Three Regulatory Imperativesfor OSHA
1. Transparency
In addressing the problem of workplace fatalities and injuries among
immigrants, OSHA should continue to embrace the principle of
transparency. In public pronouncements by its officials, OSHA has
already acknowledged that foreign-born workers face greater risks in the
workplace than their native-born counterparts. In terms of governance,
the logical next step is for OSHA to continue to gather and disseminate as
much information as possible about the workplace safety and health
concerns of the immigrant workforce and to ensure that its data collection
mechanisms capture the experiences of these workers.
Much of the literature on transparency theory describes transparency
of information as a regulatory tool that allows members of the public
(especially consumers) to make more informed choices and to protect
themselves from harm.32
Readily available data regarding workplace
hazards and trends in illnesses, injuries, and fatalities will allow immigrant
workers and their advocates to fully understand the risks posed by certain
occupations. Although immigrant workers may not have the economic
leverage to decline or change employment due to possible health and
safety concerns, at a minimum, this information would expose the
consequences of failing to use protective equipment or taking other risks
on the job and would help responsible employers to continue to improve
Transparency as a protective
protective measures and equipment.
12, 2009, at 3A.
325. See, e.g., Archon Fung, David Weil, Mary Graham & Elana Fagotto, The
PoliticalEconomy of Transparency. What Makes DisclosurePoliciesEffective? 20-21 (Ash
Inst. for Democratic Governance & Innovation, Working Paper No. OP-03-04, Dec. 2004)
(describing how the regulation of restaurant hygiene quality in Los Angeles, including the

required posting of hygiene "grades" in establishment windows, resulted in a highly
effective use of transparency as a regulatory tool), available at http://
See Cass R. Sunstein, Information
www.transparencypolicy.net/pdfs/effectiveness.pdf.

Regulation andInformationalStanding:Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-33
(1999) (describing the "rise of informational regulation").
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regulatory principle is not unknown to OSHA, which has issued hazard
communication standards requiring the disclosure of information to
workers about the risks posed by different chemicals.326
The principle of transparency is also consistent with the trend over the
last two decades of providing the public with greater access to government
information generally. 327 Access to information is viewed not only as a
moral duty of the government, but also as a way to ensure more efficient
governance.328 When political forces are left to their own devices, the
result is often information gaps or "asymmetries" that serve as obstacles to
addressing public priorities. 329 Greater access to government information
regarding the risks faced by foreign-born workers will help to guard
against any effort (intentional or otherwise) to hide the experience of
immigrants behind the broader narrative of an increasingly safe and secure
workplace. 33' The information will also allow immigrant workers and their
advocates to make a stronger case for government intervention and to link
their everyday experiences with documented trends. The principle of
transparency must, therefore, carry over into the rulemaking process to
ensure full participation by interested actors and openness regarding
agency processes and decisions. 311
By providing more information about the hazards that immigrant
workers face on the job, OSHA, workers, and organizations advocating on
behalf of immigrant workers can better identify and respond to gaps in
standard setting and enforcement. Gathering data about hazards, in turn,
requires identifying the most accurate sources of that information.
Ultimately, collection and public disclosure of the information will serve
multiple purposes: informing the public, as well as the regulatory actors,
about the risks faced in the workplace; and providing accountability and
benchmarks for the performance of the agency.
The practical implementation of this theory of transparency translates
into the following concrete proposals for OSHA to consider.

326. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2007).
327. Thomas Blanton, The World'sRight to Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 2002, at
50.
328. Id. at 53.
329. See Fung, Weil, Graham & Fagotto, supra note 325, at 1 (noting that information
asymmetries act as barriers to furthering policy objectives and government intervention is
often needed to compel disclosure by public and private organizations and agencies).
330. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (noting that, as overall fatalities
have declined, fatalities among Latino workers have increased and quoting a BLS press
release stating that fatality rates among all workers are declining).
331. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participationin the FederalRulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New
Administration,77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 926-28 (2009).
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a) Implement a Comprehensive Data Collection Plan for Illnesses,
Injuries,and FatalitiesAmong Foreign-Born Workers
OSHA and its partner agencies must evaluate the sources of existing
data and assess whether those sources provide accurate information. For
example, the new leadership at OSHA has already announced a new
recordkeeping initiative that will examine the logs and records used to
track illnesses and injuries with an eye towards possible reforms.332 OSHA
may also look to external sources of data, such as state workers'
compensation records, which may provide greater insight into the number
and nature of the accidents that have occurred.33 3
Although the existing data already suggest a significant problem
regarding health and safety issues for foreign-born workers, the need for
transparency will not be met simply by publishing data that are already
available. The BLS and OSHA should develop more specific protocols
related to data collection for foreign-born workers. One remarkable
deficiency, for example, is the paucity of information regarding workplace
illnesses and injuries among this population.334
When evaluating data, OSHA must carefully consider the inhibitions
and barriers that many foreign-born workers face when reporting illnesses
and injuries to any government agency. For example, workers may be
hesitant to come forward out of fear of retaliation or due to cultural or
linguistic barriers. For these reasons, community-based approaches to
data collection, while resource intensive, may provide a more accurate
reflection of the experience of these workers.3 35 OSHA could expand the
scope of its Alliance Program agreements to include data collection among
participating workers.33 6 Similar efforts could be undertaken through
direct partnerships with community organizations that work with
immigrant populations or through grants to such organizations.

332. OSHA Developing Recordkeeping Program to Examine Accuracy of Injury
Reporting,OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP., Mar. 26, 2009.

333. MENDELOFF, supranote 79, at 149.
334. Occupational illnesses, in particular, appear to be underreported by immigrants.
See HIDDEN TRAGEDY, supra note 9, at 12 (citing studies that explore barriers that
immigrants face in reporting occupational illnesses).
335. See, e.g., Azaroff, Levenstein & Wegman, supra note 82, at 597-98 (comparing
data collection systems for workplace injuries and illnesses in Lowell, Massachusetts, and
noting that in-home surveys among Lao and Cambodian immigrants reflected a much
higher incidence of injuries and illnesses than reflected in state workers' compensation case
records or hospital medical records).
336. See OSHA ALLIANCE PROGRAM, supra note 188.
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b) Disseminate Data to Affected Community Members and Their
Advocates
As the BLS and OSHA develop more effective mechanisms for
gathering data about foreign-born workers and occupational safety and
health, the agency must concomitantly formulate a plan to disseminate this
information to immigrant communities in an effective manner. OSHA has
already developed some outreach materials and public service
announcements in Spanish, which are targeted towards the Latino
These materials could integrate data trends
immigrant community.33
regarding foreign-born workers and the risks they face more explicitly.
This information is helpful to both workers and employers, as it helps to
quantify the risks that workers face and may influence the choices that
both workers and employers make in the workplace. Access to this data
would also help advocates in the community, as it would allow them to
target their education and training efforts and would provide empirical
support for advocacy and grant-writing purposes. Finally, enhanced
transparency in data dissemination would contribute to greater
accountability within OSHA itself, by providing visible benchmarks for
measuring the agency's progress in protecting immigrant workers.
2. CollaborativeRegulation
Collaborative regulation is another imperative to guide OSHA's
future efforts with respect to immigrant workers. In recommending this
principle of governance, I do not suggest that OSHA should adopt a laissez
faire approach or leave regulation to the private sector. Rather, this
principle calls for a diffusion of regulatory power to other stakeholders
who are able to advocate for the interests of workers at risk. By involving
a greater variety of stakeholders, this approach will also serve to counter
the historical centralization of regulatory power in the hands of OSHA and
organized labor.33
Many scholars have written about the value of collaborative
regulation, or, more broadly, collaborative governance.339 Advocates of
337. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Publications in
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance-assistance/spanish/spanish-publications.
Spanish,
html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
338. A collaborative regulatory approach will not necessarily weaken organized labor.
Collaborations between unions and worker centers (or other worker advocates) can be a
mutually beneficial relationship. See generally Jayesh Rathod, The AFL-CIO- NDLON
Agreement: Five Proposals for Advancing the Partnership,14 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 8
(2007) (describing collaboration between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer
Organization Network).
339. See, e.g., Chris Ansell & Allison Gash, CollaborativeGovernance in Theory and
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this approach emphasize that a centralized, bureaucratized regulatory
body will be ineffective in realizing public policy goals. 34' Regulators may
instinctively opt for a less effective strategy because it appears to be
"safer" or "more controllable" than a collaborative approach. 341 The
result, however, is retrenchment into a slow-moving, adversarial regulatory
model that is ultimately driven only by the most powerful interests.
Jody Freeman has criticized the ossification of federal administrative
agencies and written of the need for collaborative governance within those
agencies. 342 Freeman calls for a new approach to regulation, characterized
by five features: (1) a "problem-solving orientation," which requires
information sharing and creativity; (2) "participation by interested and
affected parties in all stages of the decision-making process"; (3)
''provisional solutions," which will allow agencies to act under conditions
of uncertainty; (4) "accountability that transcends traditional public and
private roles in governance," accompanied by questioning of long-standing
roles and functions; and (5) a "flexible, engaged agency" that perceives
itself as a facilitator in a regulatory process that involves many actors.343
OSHA has faced virulent criticism for its bureaucratic delays, lack of
engagement on emerging trends related to occupational safety and health,
and the politicization of its rulemaking and enforcement processes.
Adoption of the principle of collaborative regulation, including some of
the features suggested by Freeman, will provide a blueprint, if not a
detailed plan, for reforming OSHA.
While rife with possibilities, a collaborative regulatory approach does
present some shortcomings that must be considered. First, although this
approach welcomes the participation of a wide range of actors, many
individuals and organizations lack the experience, training, or resources to
meaningfully engage in the regulatory process. Consequently, any reforms
that call for enhanced collaboration must contemplate providing support
to newly-invited regulatory actors. This will allow for a gradual shift away

Practice, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY (2007) (conducting a study of collaborative

governance literature and identifying factors for successful collaboration); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997)
(proposing a model of collaborative governance against which to evaluate proposals for
reform). In proposing collaborative regulation as a principle, I seek to distinguish it, in
some respects, from the concept of regulatory federalism. The latter focuses on the
devolution of regulatory power from the federal government to the states. The principle I
advance encompasses a refined form of regulatory federalism, along with collaboration
with a range of non-governmental actors and interest groups.
340. John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of
AdministrativeEffectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 115, 115 (1991).
341. Id.
342. See Freeman,supra note 339, at 3-4.
343. Id, at 22.
344. Supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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from the traditional, tripartite model of regulation involving government,
employers, and organized labor. Additionally, although greater flexibility
and speed would benefit OSHA, engaging additional actors may actually
require more time and resources; moreover, any permanent standards that
are developed must necessarily be based on "substantial evidence," a factintensive standard that is partly responsible for the slow pace of the
existing standard-setting process.345
With these challenges and limitations in mind, some concrete
proposals include the following.
a) Invest in Partnerships with Community-Based Organizations for
Enforcement and TrainingPurposes
OSHA must work to include a broader range of stakeholders in its
regulatory activities.
Specifically, OSHA must pursue closer
collaborations with existing Committee/Coalition on Occupational Safety
and Health groups,"' as well as community-based organizations that work
with vulnerable immigrant workers.
Through formal, effective
partnerships, governmental and non-governmental entities can work
closely on enforcement and training efforts. Although OSHA has made
some progress in this regard with its Alliance Program, these
collaborations can be expanded significantly to include OSHA
participation in worker centers, informal hiring halls, and community
organizations that address a range of issues affecting the immigrant
community.
OSHA regulations currently authorize a "representative of
employees" to file a complaint and thereby trigger an inspection. 7 On
their face, the regulations do not specify whether community-based
organizations (and not just official collective bargaining representatives)
may file complaints. Region 2 of OSHA, which includes New York State,
has interpreted "representative of employees.., to include community
groups such as the New York Committee on Occupational Safety and
34
Health.""
OSHA has amended its Field Operations Manual, indicating
that complaints may be received from "nonprofit groups and
345. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2006). See also MINTZ, supra note 140, at 166-68 (noting that
an OSHA standard that has been challenged "will be affirmed only if supported by
'substantial evidence' and listing some of the significant court decisions on the validity of
OSHA standards).
346. Twenty-one such organizations exist around the United States and have
organized themselves under the umbrella of the National Council for Occupational Safety
and Health. National Council for Occupational Safety and Health, About Us, http://
www.coshnetwork.org/About%20Us (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
347. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11 (2007).

348. OIG IMMIGRANT

FATALITIES REPORT,

supra note 3, at 16.
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organizations. ' '349 OSHA should consider issuing an official Letter of
Interpretation at the national level, reflecting the guidance in the Field
Operations Manual and authorizing community groups and nonprofit
organizations to file complaints on behalf of vulnerable immigrant
workers.35 ° OSHA should also create a formal mechanism for workers to
designate an official representative for occupational safety and healthrelated matters. Such a structure would particularly benefit workers at
nonunion worksites and would help formalize the advocacy role of
individuals or organizations that assist immigrant workers.
Community partners, including nonprofit organizations and worker
centers, can also be important sites for education and training efforts."'
Nonunionized workers currently have few formal opportunities to receive
training, as participation in OSHA-certified courses typically occurs
through unions or larger employers. Foreign-born workers who are new to
certain industries and who are working for smaller employers are unlikely
to receive comprehensive training on health and safety issues. Community
organizations and worker centers are ideal venues to offer training courses
to this segment of the immigrant worker population.352 OSHA should also
cultivate partnerships with organizations that do not focus on workplace
issues, but nonetheless can serve as gateways for educating immigrants
about occupational safety and health issues. Community-based health
clinics and organizations that work with small business owners could serve
that purpose.
Grant making by OSHA is a necessary complement to a collaborative
approach involving community organizations, as grant funds will allow
such organizations to develop the infrastructure and programs needed to
349. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 9-3.
350. See NAT'L COUNCIL FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &

HEALTH, ACTION
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMMIGRANT WORKERS SAFETY

AND HEALTH (2004), available at http://www.coshnetwork.org/node/99.
The California
Working Immigrant Safety and Health Coalition presented a similar recommendation in its
2002 report. See CAL. WISH REPORT, supranote 81, at 21.
351. See Linda Rae Murray, Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Scientific
Evidence, Methods, and Research Implications for Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
OccupationalHealth, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 224 (2003) (urging that information
about workplace hazards should be provided in non-workplace forums such as churches,
community settings, popular radio, and television programs).
352. OSHA and several state agencies have already begun to recognize the utility of
partnering with community organizations on training efforts. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH STATE PLAN ASS'N, GRASSROOTS WORKER PROTECTION 80 (2008) [hereinafter
OSHSPA REPORT] (describing outreach initiatives in California), available at
http://www.cbs.state.or.us/osha/grassroots/pdf/2008-oshspa-report.pdf; Occupational Safety
& Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Region II Partners with Community-Based
Organization
to
Train
Spanish-Speaking
Workers,
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/
successstories/compliance-assistance/reg2_communitybased.html
(last visited Aug. 30,
2009) (highlighting a collaboration between OSHA's Region II and New Labor, a New
Jersey-based community group).
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During the Carter
address workplace safety and health issues.
administration, OSHA implemented an experimental program entitled
New Directions. The goal of the program was to "utilize labor unions,
trade associations, educational institutions, and nonprofit organizations to
provide to employers and employees job safety and health education and
training, including assistance in hazard recognition and control, and
'
New Directions was ultimately
training in employer and worker rights."353
succeeded by a similar program, the Susan Harwood Training Grant
Program.354 Additional appropriations for this program in the coming
years will be essential for OSHA to collaborate effectively with advocates
and other stakeholders in immigrant communities.
b) Create a "PivateEnforcement" Provisionfor OSHA Enforcement
The regulation of environmental hazards offers useful guidance for
incorporating the voices of affected individuals in the regulatory process.
In the environmental context, Congress has empowered affected
individuals to enforce environmental laws through the use of "citizen-suit"
provisions. These "private attorneys-general" may sue in federal district
court to enforce environmental permits and emissions limitations when the
fails to take action against a private party that is violating the
government
355
law.
Thomas McGarity and Sidney Shapiro have proposed a similar
provision for enforcing OSHA standards, given the agency's limited
enforcement resources.356 Under this proposal, affected individuals would
be able to file either before the OSHRC or directly in federal court to
enforce occupational safety and health standards. OSHA would be given
an opportunity to prosecute the action, and workers would be allowed to
seek statutory penalties and injunctive relief.357 The implementation of
such a proposal would signal a major transformation in the regulatory
regime. It would enable individuals who are directly affected by OSHA
violations to hold both their employers and OSHA accountable while
countering any entrenched agency favoritism towards employers. To be

353. Benjamin W. Mintz, OccupationalSafety and Health: The FederalRegulatory
Program-AHistory,in FUNDAMENTALS OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE 711, 711 (3d ed. 1988).
354. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Susan Harwood
Training Grant Program, http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?
p-table=FEDERALREGISTER&pjid=21574 (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (providing
information about the Susan Harwood Training Grant Program).
355. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (creating a private right of action under the
Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) (creating a private right of action under the
Clean Air Act).
356. See McGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 324-29.
357. Id.at 325.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

N YU. REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 33:479

sure, the proposal also presents some limitations, including the possibility
of abuse or inconsistent penalties. 35 8 Furthermore, the question of
standing to sue would likely arise in such cases. 9
c) Facilitate the Participation of Immigrant Workers in the
Settlement Process for OSHA Citations and Provide Greater
Protectionsfor Workers Who Choose to Report Violations
Under the existing regulations, injured workers have only limited
involvement in settlement discussions when an employer appeals an
OSHA citation to the OSHRC.
Affected employees and their
representatives may elect party status and file an objection,3 6 ° but only
related to the amount of time given to an employer to abate a workplace
hazard.36 a Apart from this limited nod to employee involvement, the
Secretary of Labor has "the unfettered discretionary authority to withdraw
or settle a citation issued to an employer.., or to settle, mitigate or
compromise any assessed penalty.""36 Several circuit courts have held that
employees cannot challenge the substantive terms of a settlement
agreement between OSHA and an employer.3 63
Providing a more prominent role for workers -especially immigrant
workers-in these substantive settlement discussions is consistent with
recognition of their humanity and their indispensable role in the
workplace. At a minimum, employees or their representatives should be
allowed to participate in settlement meetings which lead to agreements
between OSHA and employers, if only in an observer role. Another
possibility would be to modify existing law and regulations to allow
workers to formally object to the terms of a settlement; such an objection
could then lead to a secondary review." Finally, OSHA might consider
making greater use of mediation or alternative dispute resolution

358. Id.at 327-28.
359. The issue of standing has been litigated repeatedly in the context of
environmental "citizen suits." See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142
(2009); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
360. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20(a) (2007).
361. § 2200.100(b).
362. Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 927
(2d Cir. 1983).
363. See Donovan v. Allied Indus. Workers of Am., 760 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1985);
Donovan v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 718 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1983);
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 635 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176
(3d Cir. 1980).
364. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 109, at 323-24.
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mechanisms, which would allow workers to participate in face-to-face
discussions with employers and government representatives.36 5
Another provision relating to OSHA violations that merits scrutiny is
one that prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee for
having exercised a right afforded by the OSH Act.366 This provision was
included in an effort to create a space for employee participation in the
enforcement of OSHA standards. Certain practical and procedural
aspects, however, have hampered its effectiveness, particularly as applied
to immigrant workers.
First, the provision requires that a complaint regarding a violation of
the anti-discrimination provision be filed within thirty days of the
incident.367
This requirement is unduly restrictive, particularly for
immigrant workers who may be unaware of their rights under these
circumstances. A longer period of time would be consistent with other
whistleblower statutes.3' 6 A second, more practical concern is the length of
time it takes for OSHA to investigate claims that employers have
discriminated or fired an employee for exercising OSHA rights. An audit
conducted in 1997 by the Office of the Inspector General at the
Department of Labor expressed concerns regarding delays in the
investigation and litigation of such complaints.3 69 A subsequent study
similarly exposed delays in OSHA's handling of whistleblower
complaints.37
Expeditious resolution of these claims is particularly
important for immigrant workers, as economic demands or temporary
immigration status may preclude their participation in lengthy
investigative processes.
d) Harness the Successes of State-Plan States and Better Integrate
FederalandState RegulatoryEfforts
One component of collaborative regulation is the strategic reliance on
state-plan states. As noted above, in the current political climate, reliance
on individual states to regulate matters relating to immigrant workers can
365. Legislation recently introduced in Congress supports the position that the voices
of affected workers should be strengthened in the settlement process. See Protecting
America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. §§ 306-07 (2009).
366. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006).
367. § 660(c)(2).
368. See, e.g., Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519,
§ 211, 100 Stat. 2970 (1986) (ninety days); International Safe Container Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-208, § 7, 91 Stat. 1475 (1977) (sixty days).
369. OFFICE OF

INSPECTOR GEN.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE

CONGRESS 19-20 (1997), availableathttp://www.oig.dol.gov/public/semiannuals/37.pdf.
370. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EVALUATION OF OSHA's
ERA AND EPA WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS (2001), available at http://
www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2001/2E-10-105-0001.pdf.
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be risky; growing anti-immigrant sentiment has fueled calls for limiting
support and opportunities for these individuals.37 ' In this environment,
federal oversight of the work of the state-plan states is critical to ensure
the vigorous enforcement of the laws with respect to all categories of
workers.
With this concern firmly in mind, OSHA has failed to take advantage
of the generally successful records of the state-plan states. Several studies
have concluded that state-plan states have lower rates of workplace
fatalities than federal OSHA states. 37' Although data regarding nonfatal
injuries are mixed,373 there are compelling reasons for continuing to
involve states in the regulation of workplace safety and health, including
their knowledge of local trends; familiarity with affected workers,
businesses, and communities; and, in some instances, the flexibility and
political will to adopt more stringent standards. 74
Although scholars continue to debate the value of regulatory
federalism, one advantage of delegating authority to the state occupational
safety and health departments is the spirit of innovation that the state-plan
states have brought to the regulatory project.3 75 States have adopted a
number of creative approaches, including electronic access to information,
industry-specific campaigns and partnerships, plain language standards,
financial incentives, awards programs, and much more.376 OSHA can
systematically monitor the initiatives undertaken by the states as a way to
reform its own approach and recommend best practices to other
jurisdictions. In this regard, OSHA might enhance the role of the
Occupational Safety and Heath State Plan Association (OSHSPA), an
organization comprised of representative officials from the states with
OSHA-approved plans.

371. See supranote 297-302 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Bradbury, supra note 117, at 223; Morantz, supranote 194, at 201, 207.

373. In a recent study, an empirical analysis revealed that state-plan states register
higher rates of nonfatal work injuries, as compared with federal OSHA states. Morantz,
supra note 194, at 207. This outcome is puzzling, given that state-plan states typically have
lower rates of workplace fatalities, as compared with federal OSHA states. One
explanation for this discrepancy is the possible underreporting of workplace injuries in
federal OSHA states. Id.
374. See, e.g., OSHSPA REPORT, supra note 352, at 131-38 (cataloging the unique
occupational safety and health standards of various states); Bradbury, supra note 117, at
212 ("[L]ocal regulators may be more attuned to the business environment of a particular
state; therefore, local regulation may be more efficient as a result of lower monitoring
costs.").

375. See generally OSHSPA

REPORT,

supra note 352 (describing a wide range of

occupational safety and health initiatives at the state level relating to emergency
preparedness, enforcement, outreach and education, and more).
376. OSHSPA REPORT, supra note 352, at 41-42, 133-37 (describing multifaceted
approaches in Hawaii, Indiana, and Kentucky focused on the construction industry);
Bradbury, supra note 117, at 217.

Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law

2009]

A NEW VISIONFOR WORKPLACE REGULATION

549

Another strategy for enhancing coordination between federal and
state government would be the establishment of regional centers focused
on occupational and environmental health.377 These centers could be
staffed with federal and state occupational safety and health officials, who
could collaborate on research, monitoring, and the testing and
implementation of outreach and education strategies across shared
industries and geographies.
e) Foment Inter-and Intra-Agency Collaborationsat the Federaland
State Levels
As part of a collaborative regulatory approach, OSHA and its state
analogs might consider better coordination between agencies that possess
information related to employees, employers, or workplace safety and
health hazards. At the federal level, for example, OSHA might expand
upon existing efforts at information sharing and coordination with the
Employment Standards Administration (ESA) of the Department of
Labor.
Under an existing Memorandum of Understanding, ESA
representatives who encounter safety hazards while investigating violations
of other workplace laws may refer the matter to OSHA for investigation.37
A range of creative agency partnerships is possible beyond basic referrals
and information sharing.
The California government has piloted a more integrated
collaborative model with the establishment of the Economic and
"a
multi-agency
(EEEC),
Coalition
Enforcement
Employment
enforcement program consisting of investigators from the [state] Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement, Division of Occupational Safety and
Health, Employment Development Department, Contractor's State
'
In creating the
License Board, and [the] U.S. Department of Labor."379
EEEC, the state reasoned that businesses operating in the underground
economy are likely to violate multiple state laws;38 ° to effectively monitor
377. Murray, supra note 351, at 224.
378. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. CPL02-00-092: Memorandum of Understanding Between the Employment Standards
Administration and OSHA (Feb. 28, 1991), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.showdocument?p-id=1664&p-table=DIRECTIVES. This type of collaboration
is reciprocal, with OSHA forwarding any relevant information to ESA. Id. A similar
program has been adopted by Alaska Occupational Safety and Health (AKOSH).
AKOSH has developed a construction targeting system, which links worksite inspections to
information in payroll records, allowing AKOSH to plan inspections during peak
construction activity. OSHSPA REPORT, supra note 352, at 39.
379. California Department of Industrial Relations, Economic and Employment
Enforcement Coalition, http://www.dir.ca.gov/eeec/eeec.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
380. OSHSPA REPORT, supra note 352, at 58. The inspectors who comprise the
EEEC collect and share information using "standardized forms and protocols." Id.
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such employers, a coordinated approach would be more efficient than
multiple contacts by different agencies.
Similar efforts could be
undertaken among federal agencies, perhaps through an initial pilot
project in a particular region.
Another fertile area for collaboration is between state workers'
compensation agencies and state occupational safety and health
agencies."' Workers' compensation records could be used to supplement
the agencies' own data sets."' The records might also suggest injury,
illness, or fatality trends among particular employers and industries. In
turn, this information may inform the enforcement and rulemaking activity
of the occupational safety and health agency.
f) Make Better Use of the Existing "Toolbox" of Regulatory Tools
By making better use of existing regulatory tools and increasing the
number of voices in the standard-setting process, OSHA can begin to
address specific workplace safety concerns that disproportionately affect
immigrant workers.
The most direct route for individuals and organizations to jumpstart a
rulemaking process is through a petition to promulgate, modify, or revoke
a standard.3" 3 As trends relating to workplace safety and health emerge,
interested parties can appeal to OSHA to issue a new standard or to
strengthen an existing one.384 While a petition to promulgate typically
381. A similar collaboration is already taking place in New York, where the state
Workers' Compensation Board has partnered with OSHA to jointly develop training
materials and share best practices. See Press Release, Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Joins with New York State Workers' Compensation
Board to Reduce Injuries and Illnesses in Empire State Workplaces (Jan. 25, 2006),
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=NEWS
RELEASES&pid=11865. Based on the information provided by OSHA, it appears that
this collaboration is limited to education and training and does not include the strategic use
of workers' compensation data for OSHA enforcement purposes. Id.
382. Such comparisons have already been made by scholars who wish to highlight the
limitations of the BLS's data. See, e.g., Leslie I. Boden & Al Ozonoff, Capture-Recapture
Estimates of Nonfatal Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 18 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 500,
501, 503 (2008) (comparing workers' compensation data from six states with the BLS's data
and concluding that both data sets show likely underreporting of injuries with greater
underreporting in the BLS's statistics).
383. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1911.3 (2007). As a supplemental
strategy, advocates can turn to the courts to compel agency action that is "unreasonably
delayed." See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
384. In 2002, for example, the Rhode Island Committee on Occupational Safety and
Health, a non-governmental organization, partnered with the Rhode Island Workers'
Rights Board of Jobs with Justice, a union and community coalition, to request that OSHA
promulgate a standard relating to motor vehicle and traffic safety. Rhode Island
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health, Petition to the U.S. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration Requesting a Standard for Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety
(July 17, 2002), available at http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/RICOSH-OSHA
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requires some empirical support, immigrant worker advocates are well
suited to make direct appeals to OSHA, either independently or in
collaboration with organized labor. Moreover, OSHA could facilitate the
submission of these standards by developing clear, reasonable procedures
for submitting such petitions. A publicly available list of pending petitions
would facilitate cooperation and information sharing between interested
parties across the country.
Another tool that OSHA can utilize more effectively is negotiated
rulemaking, which, as noted above, allows a range of interest groups to
develop a consensus standard that is later presented to OSHA for formal
approval.385 As it has done in the past, OSHA can proactively call for the
establishment of a negotiated rulemaking committee in light of data trends
regarding particular hazards.386 Although negotiated rulemaking appears
on its face to be a welcome alternative to traditional rulemaking, several
potential shortcomings must be considered. First, negotiated rulemaking is
not necessarily quicker than the standard notice-and-comment process.387
Moreover, negotiated rulemaking can be costly and time consuming for
participants, which may limit the participation of stakeholders from the
nonprofit sector. 88 Some scholars have also expressed concern that
negotiated rulemaking represents a potentially dangerous delegation of
control to the private sector.389 This concern may weigh in favor of an
alternate approach, which would involve the establishment of advisory
committees that would seek broad public input but would not be
responsible for crafting the text of a final rule.39
petition-2002.pdf.
385. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006).
386. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA Trade News Release: OSHA Establishes
Crane and Derrick Negotiated Rulemaking Committee (June 11, 2003) (describing how
OSHA published a notice in the Federal Register seeking comments on creating a
negotiated rulemaking committee for crane and derrick safety and then established the
committee after observing broad support), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owadisp.show document?p-table=NEWS RELEASES&pjid=10246.
387. For example, negotiated rulemaking contributed significantly to the drafting of a
steel erection standard. The first request for negotiated rulemaking was made in 1990, but
the final rule was not issued until 2001. Safety Standards for Steel Erection, 66 Fed. Reg.
5196-97 (Jan. 18, 2001).
388. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate)
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEx. L. REV. 987, 998 (2008). A related
budgetary concern is the cost to the agency itself. Id. at 997 ("There is no question that
convening and conducting a [negotiated rulemaking] involves a greater cost than organizing
a notice-and-comment process.").
389. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiationand the Subversion of the PublicInterest,46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1375-76 (1997).
390. Section 7 of the OSH Act explicitly authorizes the creation of advisory
committees to assist with the development of standards. 29 U.S.C. § 656(b) (2006). Such
advisory committees could, for example, address the growing concerns related to workplace
violence, or the risks faced by immigrant domestic workers. See supra Section III. The
California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board offers a slightly different
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Interpretive guidance is another regulatory tool that OSHA could
Currently, OSHA issues
deploy on behalf of immigrant workers.
interpretations of standards in response to questions posed by employers
or other interested parties.39 1 Instead of relying upon inquiries from the
private sector, OSHA could conduct a review of the standards that are
implicated in fatalities and injuries among immigrant workers by
examining incident and investigation reports. Where ambiguities in
standards exist, OSHA can issue interpretive guidance in order to provide
the strongest level of protection for vulnerable workers.3"
3. Antisubordination
The principle of antisubordination has been carefully parsed by
scholars of constitutional law, particularly those writing about the Equal
Protection Clause. The antisubordination principle rests on a "conviction
that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior
social status of historically oppressed groups., 39 3 Antisubordination
theorists envision fundamental changes to societal structures, as opposed
to anti-discrimination theories, which call for enshrining formal equality in
the law.394
Although these concepts are closely related, the
antisubordination principle suggests that the law should be structured to
"remove the conditions that contribute to the establishment of an
underclass in society," while the traditional anti-discrimination principle
merely calls for equal treatment and the uniform application of laws.395
The principle of antisubordination is directly relevant to the
experience of immigrant workers in the United States and the hazards that

committee model. See Cal. Dep't of Indus. Relations, Occupational Safety & Health
Standards Board, http://www.dir.ca.gov/OSHsb/oshsb.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
This seven-person Board, comprised of representatives of management, labor, and the
general public, is responsible for setting standards and granting variances. Id.
391. See Chamber of Commerce v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 636 F.2d
464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Interpretive rules 'are statements as to what the administrative
officer thinks the statute or regulation means."' (quoting Citizens to Save Spencer County
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 600 F.2d 844, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
392. In issuing guidance of this nature, OSHA must be cautious that its interpretations
do not stray into outright revisions of the standards. See, e.g., Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n,
Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("When an agency has
given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that
interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish
without notice and comment.").
393. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles overBrown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
394. See Francisco Valdes, Culture by Law: Backlash as Jurisprudence, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 1135, 1166 (2005).
395. Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and
the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace,67 OHIO ST.L.J. 961, 1018 (2006).
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they continue to face on the job. Immigrant workers are marginalized in
the regulatory process not simply because they lack advocates or because
they are disparately affected by limitations in the regulatory regime. The
historical invisibility and subordination of immigrant workers-especially
Latino workers-also contributes to their challenges in the workplace
safety context. Indeed, public attention to worker safety issues is greatest
when the individuals affected are made visible and are identifiable:
Their spokesmen can testify at hearings, bringing along those
already afflicted owing to lax standards or enforcement in the
past. They can ask, "What will you do to protect us?" In this
situation, the culture's strictures against putting a money value on
life are heavily reinforced. OSHA officials do appear to show less
concern for costs when the potential beneficiaries are more easily
identifiable.396
Over many decades, American law has been complicit in rendering
immigrant labor "invisible" and easily commodified. Throughout much of
the twentieth century, U.S. immigration law has been structured to provide
a low cost, disposable pool of immigrant labor.
The infamously
exploitative Bracero Program, under which approximately one million
Mexican workers were temporarily admitted into the United States to
serve the needs of the agricultural sector, is indicative of the way in which
law has tacitly (yet indelibly) framed immigrant labor, particularly Latino
immigrant labor, as an expendable and replaceable resource, rather than a
group of people bearing rights.39 7 This commodification of immigrant
labor also surfaced several decades before the Bracero Program during the
Great Depression, when the U.S. government repatriated what industry
believed to be an excess of Mexican immigrant laborers, many of whom
had lawfully established permanent residence in the United States.398
Given these historical and legal underpinnings, immigrant laborers are
often perceived by employers, the government, and the American public
as a temporary resource, and they are used to meet shifting demands of the
market.39 9 Immigrant workers entered the national consciousness with
396.

MENDELOFF,

supra note 79, at 72-73.

397. See

Linda Chavez-Thompson, It's Time to End Worker Exploitation,
FORBES.COM, June 6, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/05/labor-immigrants-workersoped-cx ict 06061abor.html (recalling the failure of the U.S. government and employers to
provide Bracero Program workers with healthcare, adequate working conditions, or
promised wages).
398. CAMILLE GUERIN-GONZALES, MEXICAN WORKERS AND AMERICAN DREAMS 77-

78 (1994).
399. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Eileen Connelly, Executive Director, SEIU Pennsylvania State Council)

(describing the exploitative conditions faced by immigrant workers, especially temporary
guest workers), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1983&
wit id=5501.
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these attributes and have continued to occupy that space, despite efforts to
underscore their demographic complexity. This historic categorization of
immigrant labor dovetails with the mark of "foreignness" that Latino
immigrants, along with Asian immigrants, have carried in the context of a
This set of historical
society built around Black-White relations.'
conditions, together with the ongoing subordination and dehumanization
of immigrant laborers, has rendered the group vulnerable in the
workplace.
Immigrant workers continue to be categorized as expendable labor to
the present day. Current debates around immigration reform and efforts
to create new categories of "guest worker" visas reinforce the perception
of immigrant labor as a commodity to be used on a short-term basis and
then discarded. 41 The Latino immigrant worker has emerged as the
central protagonist in the immigration reform debate. This is wholly
consistent with the presumed "foreignness" ascribed to many categories of
immigrants and the general expectation that the sojourn of these workers
in the United States will be temporary and will cleanly meet the needs of
the market without reciprocal obligations to protect their safety, health, or
other rights. When these immigrant workers overstay their employment
visas or begin to occupy a broader role in the economy and society,
demands for their removal from some sectors have been immediate and
fierce. The controversies that have encircled day laborer centers perfectly
highlight these interrelated factors, as day laborers are much more visible
than other immigrant workers because they seek work in public view.4 2
The data regarding the trends in workplace fatalities and injuries
among foreign-born workers, particularly Latino immigrant workers, raise
a host of questions about their underpinnings. To be sure, fatality and
injury rates, and corresponding enforcement efforts, may fluctuate
depending on political considerations and the relative power of OSHA in a
given administration. The trend, however, is not simply a reflection of lack
of political will or financial resources, but is reflective of a more complex
set of drivers, including the multifaceted subordination of foreign-born
workers in the United States, both historically and in the context of current
debates regarding the role of immigrant workers in the U.S. economy.
In moving forward to address this trend, OSHA must be mindful of
this history of subordination and consider steps to "re-center" the
400. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the
Inter/NationalImagination,85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1414 (1997).
401. See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.splcenter.org/pdf/static/
SPLCguestworker.pdf.
402. See, e.g., Bill Turque, Herndon to Shut Down Center for Day Laborers,WASH.
POST, Sept. 6, 2007, at Al (describing the latest developments in controversy over town
council's decision to shut day laborer center in spite of judicial mandate).
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immigrant worker and to begin to address the factors that have
contributed to her marginalization. Among the relevant factors are
linguistic isolation, concerns about immigration status, and the societal
view towards the value of immigrant labor.
The following
recommendations flow from this approach.
a) Develop a Memorandum of Understanding Between OSHA and
the Departmentof HomelandSecurity
OSHA should explore a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which specifies that U.S.
Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE) will refrain from
conducting a worksite raid or otherwise engaging in enforcement
operations at any worksite that is being investigated by OSHA for possible
safety and health violations. The MOU should specify that ICE agents will
not use the convening of a workplace safety meeting as a cover for
conducting a workplace raid, as occurred at the Seymour Johnson Air
Force Base in North Carolina in 2005. 4o3
Such an MOU has historical antecedents: in November 1998, the
Department of Labor and the INS entered into an MOU intended to
coordinate the enforcement activities of the two agencies and to establish
procedures for information sharing and mutual training. 4 4 Notably, the
MOU specifies that the two "agencies will develop and implement
policies.., that avoid inappropriate worksite interventions where it is
known or reasonably suspected that a labor dispute is occurring and the
intervention may, or may be sought so as to, interfere in the dispute
matter., 40 5 Further, it declares that the Department of Labor will not ask
workers for their immigration status nor review employers' 1-9
(employment eligibility verification) forms while conducting labor
standards investigations based on workers' complaints alleging violations
of their employment rights "so as to avoid discouraging complaints from
unauthorized workers who may be victims of labor standards violations by
40 6
their employer.,
403. See Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., North Carolina Work Site Enforcement Action
Puts Workers at Risk, 19 IMMIGRANTS' RTS. UPDATE (2005) ("On July 6, 2005, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents arrested and detained immigrant
workers from the Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, North Carolina, by
posing as staff members of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).").
404. Employment Standard Admin., Dep't of Labor, Memorandum of Understanding
(Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/whatsnew/mou/nov98mou.htm.
Although the Bush Administration never formally withdrew the agreement, its ongoing
effect is unclear, particularly given the incorporation of the INS into DHS. Similarly, it is
unclear how the Obama administration will interpret the existing MOU.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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Although such an agreement would not prevent employers from
making retaliatory threats related to immigration status, the agreement
would, at a minimum, prevent those threats from being realized, at least in
the short term. Moreover, in order for such an agreement to have a
positive effect on employee behavior-i.e., an effect that would encourage
the reporting of potential occupational safety and health violations-it
must be accompanied by clear public statements from agency leaders and
be integrated into related training materials targeted at immigrant
populations.
Such an agreement would also require enhanced
communication between DHS and the occupational safety and health
agencies for approved state-plan states.
b) Develop a Comprehensive Language Access Plan for OSHA and
Adopt Related Changes to Worker TrainingProtocols
Linguistic competence is a major barrier for OSHA in its inspections
and enforcement efforts. OSHA must increase the percentage of its
inspectorate that is fluent in Spanish and other languages spoken by
immigrant workers."' Enhanced communication between workers and
government occupational safety and health personnel is likely to facilitate
the presentation, processing, and resolution of complaints.4" 8
As the
workplace continues to diversify and as employers recruit temporary guest
workers from across the globe,4 9 the need for OSHA to adopt a nuanced
language access plan is paramount. In crafting such a plan, and in
allocating resources, OSHA might look to regional and state data
regarding immigrant populations, languages spoken, and immigrant
representation in particular industries. Building upon this information,
OSHA could establish protocols for tracking language needs at particular
worksites. Considerations of language access must also be part of OSHA's
oversight of state-plan states and its review of work by OSHA grantees.
Apart from enforcement and outreach, an agency language access plan

407. This common-sense recommendation was made by the Department of Labor's
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in its 2003 Report. OIG suggested that OSHA
could increase its language proficiency through staff training or by emphasizing language
ability in new hires. See OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at v. OSHA
might adopt the practice of the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry, which lists
foreign language ability as a desirable trait on all job announcements. See OSHSPA
Report, supra note 352, at 91.
408. Data from the Washington Division of Safety and Health, as reported by the
OSHSPA, reveal that safety investigations involving Spanish-speaking workers are less
likely to be dismissed, and more likely to settle, when a bilingual investigator is handling
the matter. OSHSPA Report, supra note 352, at 127-28.
409. The plight of guest workers from India, for example, has received significant
public attention. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Workers on HungerStrike Say They Were Misled
on Visas, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A9.
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must also cover training efforts. OSHA regulations require that workers
be trained to carry out their job duties in a safe manner. In a recent
report, OSHA estimated that "about 25% of the fatalities the agency
41
investigates are in some way related to language or cultural barriers.""
The traditional training curricula, however, need to be adapted to the
needs of the immigrant workforce. First, language ability as well as
literacy must be considered when developing training materials.411
Although OSHA has translated much of its website, along with many of its
outreach materials, into Spanish, the agency must take a more thoughtful
approach to the issue of limited English proficiency. In its 2003 report, the
Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Labor recommended
that OSHA "[i]ssue an Interpretation Letter... requir[ing] employers to
provide training in a manner that employees understand taking into
account different languages and literacy levels."4 1
Safety training
curricula should also be prepared in a culturally appropriate manner4 13 and
should be tailored to the unique vulnerabilities and risk factors of different
segments of the immigrant workforce.4 14
By way of example, Nevada has implemented a more targeted,
rigorous approach for training workers with limited or no English
proficiency. Nevada's OSHA requires that written materials and trainings
by employers be made available "in a language and format"
understandable to each employee.415 Inspectors look beyond the mere fact
of translation or interpretation and assess how employers are evaluating
their workers' actual understanding of the materials.4 16 Such an approach,
if adopted at the federal level, could constitute a small part of a larger
language access plan.
410. OSHA Programs to Help Hispanic Workers, supra note 34.

411. OIG IMMIGRANT

FATALITIES REPORT,

supra note 3, at iv.

412. Id. at v. A "Letter of Interpretation" is a form of "supplementary guidance that
clarifies the application of an established policy or procedure." Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Directive No. ADM-03-00-002: OSHA Policy
Issuances (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show
document?p-table=DIRECTIVES&pjid=2225.
413. Oregon OSHA has adopted an Occupational Safety and Health Program for
Spanish-speaking workers, entitled PESO (Programa en Espafiol de Seguridad e Higiene
en el Trabajo de Oregon OSHA, or Oregon OSHA Spanish Language Program on
Workplace Safety and Health). The PESO program features a module on "Cultures,
Language and Safety." See OSHSPA Report, supra note 352, at 89; PESO - Oregon
OSHA Program in Spanish, http://www.cbs.state.or.us/osha/educate/peso.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2009).
414. As noted above, existing research suggests that younger workers and male
workers may be particularly susceptible to workplace hazards. See supra Section I.
Immigrant women workers may also face a high risk of injury, depending on the industries
in which they are employed. Additional research would help identify trends which, in turn,
can be addressed through training curricula.
415. OSHSPA Report, supra note 352, at 86.

416. Id.
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c) Increase Penaltiesfor Violations and Discretionin Assessing Fines
The project of restoring the importance of workplace safety and
health, particularly as it applies to immigrant workers, requires a renewed
emphasis on the value of immigrant lives and the cost of failing to protect
them. In this vein, increased maximum penalties are essential in order for
the sanctions to have a deterrent effect. OSHA might also consider
increasing the "criminal charges under § 17(e) of the OSH Act from a
misdemeanor to a felony, and [expanding] § 17(e) to cover employers
417
whose willful violations result in serious physical harm."
Several of the state-plan states have already moved in the direction of
imposing more stringent penalties for a range of violations. Eight of the
state-plan states impose higher maximum prison sentences than the federal
government for willful violations that result in death. 8 In California, for
example, an employer may be prosecuted for committing a felony and can
face two to three years in prison.41 9 California law also allows for the
prosecution of individuals who are in management positions and does not
allow these individuals to hide behind the corporate veil for purposes of
liability."z Similarly, Virginia has adopted a manslaughter policy under
which criminal manslaughter prosecutions are recommended when
"flagrant violations" of state occupational safety and health laws result in a
421
worker fatality.
The initial decisions relating to penalties rest with OSHA officers who
follow guidelines contained in OSHA's Field Operations Manual. One
possible modification to the manual, which would address the specific
history of subordination of immigrant workers, would allow OSHA
officers to consider an employer's deliberate exploitation of a worker's
immigration status when deciding on the amount of the penalty. OSHA
guidelines currently provide for assessment of penalties based on the
"gravity of the violation," the "size of the employer's business," whether
the employer has acted in "good faith," and the "employer's history of
previous violations. '422 The "good faith" factor currently allows for a
penalty reduction when an employer has, inter ai'a, addressed the unique
needs of limited English proficient and non-English-speaking workers. 2 3
417. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at v. Increased penalties
have also been proposed in legislation currently pending in Congress. See Protecting
America's Workers Act, H.R. 2067, 111th Cong. §§ 310-11 (2009).
418. These states are Arizona, California, Iowa, Michigan, Puerto Rico, Tennessee,
Utah, and Vermont. OIG IMMIGRANT FATALITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. OSHSPA Report, supranote 352, at 66.
422. OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 84, at 6-3.
423. Id. at 6-12.
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This factor could be expanded to allow for a penalty increase when the
workplace safety and health needs of such individuals are deliberately
disregarded because of their immigration status.
CONCLUSION

The workplace experiences of immigrants in the United States have
garnered significant attention, and justifiably so. A range of issues, from
employment discrimination to wage and hour violations to human
trafficking, have captured the attention of activists and scholars. With this
article, I have sought to raise the profile of an equally important workplace
concern for immigrants: the dangerous hazards that many immigrant
workers encounter on a daily basis at their places of work. As documented
herein, all too many immigrants have succumbed to these hazards,
resulting in countless injuries and a disproportionate number of workplace
fatalities.
The statistics relating to injuries and fatalities are, on one level,
unsurprising. Immigrant workers in the United States have historically
faced abuse and mistreatment on the job and have long been exposed to
unsafe working conditions. Cultural, linguistic, and class differences, often
reinforced by economic forces and concerns about immigration status,
have curtailed the power of immigrants in the workplace. The spike in the
data, however, is not attributable solely to long-standing social and
economic conditions. The role of OSHA, as the agency responsible for
regulating safety in the workplace, deserves significant scrutiny.
As laid out above, the history, structure, and present-day operations of
OSHA have obscured the workplace safety and health concerns of
immigrants, thereby contributing to conditions that underlie the fatality
and injury trends among immigrant workers. To be sure, OSHA has
acknowledged these trends and has made efforts to address them. The
remedies adopted thus far by the agency, however, will not correct the
deeper structural deficiencies in the regulatory regime that disadvantage
immigrant workers. OSHA must embrace a new vision of workplace
regulation that acknowledges the growing ranks of immigrant workers and
the agency's failures with respect to those workers. Greater transparency
is needed to shed light on the nature of the problem and to monitor
OSHA's response.
Similarly, a cooperative approach to regulation will help to diffuse
power to community-based organizations and to the workers themselves so
that both may be active participants in the regulatory process. While many
unions are genuinely concerned about the plight of immigrant workers,
OSHA's heavy reliance on unions for worker advocacy, combined with
unions' historical difficulties in organizing immigrant workers, leave many
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immigrant workers without an advocate on safety and health issues.
Opening up the sphere of advocacy to other entities such as workers' rights
centers, nonprofit organizations, and the workers themselves will allow for
the needs of immigrant workers to be heard and addressed by OSHA.
Finally, OSHA must take affirmative steps to correct for the various
ways in which immigrant workers, by operation of law or due to the
absence of legal protection, have been subordinated in the workplace and
left even more vulnerable to safety and health hazards. Linguistic isolation
and exploitation of immigration status concerns are two elements of this
mistreatment, which can begin to be reversed through the adoption of a
regulatory imperative of antisubordination.
Enhanced penalties for
OSHA violations will also serve to counter the commodification of
immigrant labor and the historical devaluing of immigrant lives.
These principles of transparency, collaborative regulation, and
antisubordination can serve as guideposts for OSHA, or for other agencies
that have failed to adequately address the needs and concerns of a
disadvantaged constituency. This type of fundamental reexamination of
the regulatory approach is necessary in order to provide a basic level of
protection and oversight for immigrant workers while strengthening their
voices in the regulatory regime.
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